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 The current global environment and technological advancements of society has 
led to an increase in the visibility of crisis throughout the international community. 
Humanity cannot stand idly by as spectators to humanitarian crisis on the scale of what 
we have seen in recent years. For this reason it is vital that an international mechanism 
for intervention be as proficient and capable as possible, to respond rapidly and 
effectively, to situations as they unfold. The United Nations is the only entity poised to 
fulfill this role. Therefore it is imperative to learn from the successes and failures of this 
organizations intervention attempts in order to duplicate strategies that work and take 
corrective actions for strategies that failed. 
 For this reason, this paper looks at several UN successes and failures in order to 
glean information on why each one succeeded or failed. The scope of this paper does not 
allow for a complete review and therefore further research should follow. When 
highlighting problems, it is also important to present potential solutions. For this reason 
I explore the potential viability of a dedicated United Nations response force via the 
utilization of Private Military Security Companies. 
 By reviewing several case studies involving both UN Peace Keeping Operations 
and UN Nation Building Operations, several limitations to UN effectiveness can be 
highlighted. This includes a lack of flexibility, inability to muster adequate force and 
inability to react to the changing environments. Each of these limitations is predicated on 
the UN mandate and their dependence on the member states for support which comes 
iii 
 
primarily when there is a vested interest by a state or when the atrocities reach a level of 
international crisis.  
 The incorporation of Private Military Security Companies would solve many of 
the inadequacies observed with UN response however; there are several steps that are 
required prior to being able to implement this approach. This includes the stigma 
associated with these groups and the current lack of available oversight or accountability 
protocols established to govern these groups. Therefore, under the current environment 
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“More than ever before in human history, we share a common destiny. We can master it 
only if we face it together. And that is why we have the United Nations.” ― Kofi Annan 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to observe the effectiveness of third party 
intervention on civil conflicts, with a focus on the United Nations (UN). It will also 
discuss how the International community can deal with these conflicts, as external 
factors, like globalization, continue to increase the strain of failed states on the 
international community. According to 2014 statistics, as presented by the Fragile State 
Index, one hundred and twenty six countries are considered less than stable, with Thirty 
Four countries being in an alert status.
1
 In order to develop strategies going forward it is 
important to look back at both the successes and failures of the United Nations and offer 
hypothesis on improving the UN response to failed states. Based on my personal 
experiences and interests, part of this inquiry is meant to determine if the incorporation of 
Private Military Security Companies into the UN strategy would be a viable option for 
future interventions. 
 Since the Cold war there has been a shift in focus from interstate conflicts based 
on the circulation of ideology, to a rise in civil conflicts and failed states, left in the wake 
of the fall of the Soviet Union and the shift away from a western colonization philosophy. 
With the incorporation of technology and the rise of the global media machine, the 
humanitarian atrocities associated with many of these conflicts do not allow for the 
international community to continue standing idly by. The primary international 
responses to these atrocities have been driven several international organizations like the 
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United Nations, North American Treaty Organization (NATO) European Union (EU) or 
Organization of African Unity (OAU). The United States has also played a key role in 
many of the past international interventions in regards to funding, providing personnel or 
expertise, or flexing its soft power, as the global hegemon through international pressure. 
The United States has also interfered directly with other nations under the guise of 
humanitarian responsibility and has been the compelling force behind coalition building 
in order to intervene for their own self-interest, for example Iraq and Afghanistan. The 
United States is currently entering a stage of war weariness and economic downturn as 
the federal budget deficit continues to climb. There is currently a lack of political will, or 
societal will, for continued military or financial intervention in the affairs of foreign 
countries. At the same time the atmosphere of national security has shifted towards the 
geo-political realm, or the international community, with the rise of global terrorism, 
transnational crime and the possible international ramifications of climate change. As 
these are international problems it is necessary that an international body position 
themselves to respond to the inevitable crisis that will continue to occur in the future. The 
primary body, with the current history of international intervention and predominate 
legitimacy, to accomplish this mission is the United Nations. 
 This thesis is divided into three interconnected chapters that are designed to take a 
look at some of the past interventions associated with the United Nations. These parts are 
divided into peacekeeping operations, nation building operations and a final chapter on 
the efficacy of Private Military Security Companies (PMSC’s) and their emerging role in 
civil conflicts.  
3 
 
The first chapter provides a description of the United Nations structure, budget 
and mandate to the International community and highlights several key terms utilized 
throughout the chapter. Most of the literature on this topic was divided into pre-Cold War 
and post-Cold War era’s based on the shift in geopolitical strategies that occurred at this 
time. This paper focuses on the post-cold war era and further divides UN response to pre 
September 11, 2001 and Post September 11, 2001. Some of the literature attempted to use 
empirical data to determine peacekeeping efficacy however the results of the various 
academics appears inconclusive as they all appear to poke holes in the criteria used to 
formulate each other’s data. The general consensus from most authors however is that 
United Nations Peacekeeping operations do maintain positive influence on creating and 
maintaining peace.
2
 Several authors utilized case studies and highlighted the possibility 
that the UN’s own structure could be the catalyst for the difficulty in determining its 
efficacy at peacekeeping.  From the literature two primary points of weakness were 
established. First that the UN requires cooperation from the conflict parties in order to 
intervene and second that they do not maintain an operational force and are therefore 
reliant on their member states. This often means that they lack the necessary speed and 
flexibility to respond effectively.  
In order to delve into these issues I utilized the Peacekeeping operations of 
Somalia and Sierra Leone as case studies. The Somalia operation highlighted the fact that 
operations can change very quickly and often outside the control of the UN, therefore the 
UN must inject flexibility into its operational planning. The Sierra Leone operation 
                                                          
2
 Hoeffler, Anke. "Can international interventions secure the peace?."International Area Studies Review 17, 
no. 1 (2014): 75-94. 
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highlighted the importance of the UN expanding its mission when necessary beyond 
peacekeeping operations to nation building operations. 
The second chapter transitioned into the natural next phase in UN operations from 
Peacekeeping operations to Peace Building operations. The first part of this chapter 
provides an explanation for this transition as well as identifying why it is important to 
distinguish between these two UN types of operations. It also includes the potential 
conflicts between them. The literature focuses on these conflicts but includes the caveat 
that they are not mutually exclusive and can actually be contradictory. You can have a 
peacekeeping operation without injecting peace building but you cannot build a state 
without first incorporating an established peace. In actuality, the compromise necessary 
for the establishment of peace may actually thwart any chance for continued peace. 
Intervention itself may weaken state institutions or could bypass local leaders. The author 
Roland Paris points out that the liberalist ideals of democracy and free market economy 
also promote conflict amongst political parties or between businesses for the market. 
3
Therefore the implementation of either should be slow. This may not be feasible as it 
would be a hard sell for the member states funding the intervention. The Author Eva 
Bertram focuses on the UN’s own mandates of neutrality during conflict resolution and 
the noninterference within sovereign affairs as blockades to effective peace building.
4
 
 The case studies utilized to validate these theories were the UN responses to the 
Rwandan and Namibian crisis. Rwanda being an example of what many would say was a 
failed attempt at peace building and Namibia being a historically determined positive 
outcome. Both interventions were hampered by insufficient personnel. For Rwanda, the 
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 Paris, Roland. At war's end: building peace after civil conflict. Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
4
 Bertram, Eva. "Reinventing Governments the Promise and Perils of United Nations Peace 
Building." Journal of Conflict Resolution 39, no. 3 (1995): 387-418. 
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initial monitoring force was insufficient and then, in response to aggression, the force 
was initially reduced further prior to being reinforced. For Namibia the force deployed 
was immediately smaller than what was anticipated due to a lack of support from member 
states. The most significant difference for this mission was the diversity of the UN 
coalition. This group included soldiers, law enforcement and support elements to include 
election experts. Also the UN did stray from their neutrality mandate by recognizing the 
opposition force as the legitimate leadership for Namibia. 
 As I believe there is a defined necessity for UN intervention in civil conflicts and 
as highlighted above, several discrepancies in the structure and response of the UN to 
these conflicts, it is also important to look at available alternatives that could bolster UN 
response. For this reason, the third chapter looks at the use of Private Military Security 
Companies (PMSC) during civil conflicts in an attempt to observe their viability as a 
potential asset to the UN. The vast majority of the literature on PMSC’s focused on the 
international communities attempt to hold these entities accountable for violations of 
social and international law. There is also expansive literature on the industries own 
attempt to establish their legitimacy within this international community. Examples of 
potential accountability are the establishment of the Montreux document, the use of 
International Humanitarian Laws or the use of domestic laws of the home state, like the 
Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) for Department of Defense (DOD) 
contractors. On the opposite side the International Code of Conduct for Private Security 
Service Providers (ICoC) is a voluntary assurance from PMSC’s that they will abide by 
the suggestions of the Montreux document. This code was established by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), but has been recognized by the UN 
6 
 
and incorporated into their mandates for the hiring of PMSC’s. Since it is voluntary, it is 
a means by which PMSC’s can set them apart on the international stage. 
 In order to test the literatures hypothesis on a lack of regulation for PMSC’s and 
to challenge their legitimacy within the international community, two case studies were 
conducted based on high profile incidents involving PMSC’s. The first case study 
covered the Nisur Square incident in 2007 and the second covered the Abu Ghraib prison 
scandal. Both of these where covered heavily in the international media and therefore are 
highly publicized incidents. For the Nisur square case study the various options for 
prosecution and investigation were observed and tested. The findings were that, in this 
scenario, there is currently no clearly defined regulatory body for the investigation and 
potential prosecution of the contractors involved. While the Department of Justice has 
recently achieved convictions for those involved in the Nisur square incident, there 
remains questions on the constitutionality of these convictions as the case heads to the US 
Federal Court of Appeals
5
. For Abu Ghraib the end results have been very different. 
While the military entities involved in the scandal faced punishment, the contractors did 
not because there was no clear method of prosecution. Both of these examples bolster the 
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II. UN Peacekeeping Operations: 
“The U.N.'s impartiality allows it to negotiate and operate in some of the toughest places 
in the world. And time and again, studies have shown that U.N. peacekeeping is far more 
effective and done with far less money than what any government can do on its own.”---
Ban Ki-moon 
 
We live in tumultuous times. Since September 11, 2001, many terrorist 
organizations have formed, the Arab Spring has overthrown several established 
governments in the Middle East and Africa and the Palestinian/ Israeli conflict continues 
to rage. These events illustrate how fundamentally different ideological beliefs can cause 
interstate tensions or conflicts. However, turmoil may be the only consistent variable 
within the last century. With globalization and the worlds continued acceleration towards 
modernity, atrocities that used to be a world away are now being played out in our living 
rooms. The United Nations (UN) maintains a responsibility to its original mandate of 
maintaining peace throughout the world. In this chapter we will look at the UN structure, 
its role in regards to maintaining the peace and, through the use of case studies, some 
potential flaws in the UN structure that may weaken its overall effectiveness. 
The United Nations, a successor to the League of Nations, was formally 
established in 1945 as a cooperative entity between 51states.
6
 The UN Charter for this 
international organization, spurred by fresh memories of two world wars, focuses 
predominately on maintaining peace and stability between all nations of the world.
7
  
Today, the UN has 192 sovereign nation members and its legitimacy is unquestioned.
8
 
With a primary mandate to maintain peace, the question remains, are Peace Keeping 
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 United Nations Department of Public Information. 2000. Basic facts about the united nations, United 
Nations Publications, Pg. 1 
7
 Ibid Pg. 1 
8
 Fasulo, Linda M. 2009. An insider's guide to the UN, Yale University Press. Pg. 5 
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Operations (PKO’s) still a viable tool and are they effective in implementing this 
mandate? 
 The UN is the quintessential international organization with a yearly operational 
budget of roughly $2.5 billion. This figure does not include subordinate agencies such as 
World Health Organization (WHO), or the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
whose total budgets can reach nearly $20 billion each year.
9
 The UN is divided into six 
principle organs that include the Secretariat, the Security Council, the General Assembly, 
the International Court of Justice, the Trustee Council and the Economic and Social 
Council.
10
 While the primary mandate is international peace, this organization also 
maintains committees responsible for providing guidance, assistance, regulation or even 
legal enforcement for topics that range from HIV epidemics, climate change, 
development, humans rights, international law or even aviation regulation, all designed to 
ensure a stable global community .
11
  
 The peacekeeping mandate falls under the organ of the Security Council which 
includes five permanent states and ten elected member states, that rotate regularly, who 
vote on mandates to control the vast arsenal of peacekeeping options at their disposal.
12
 
Under this main organ exists the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and 
the Department of Field Support (DFS) which are charged with carrying out and 
logistical support for, the peacekeeping operations mandated by the Security Council.
13
 
The authority for these actions comes from the United Nations Charter, Chapter VII, 
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 Ibid Pg. 153-154 
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 Ibid Pg. 6 
11
 United Nations Department of Public Information. 2000. Basic facts about the united nations, United 
Nations Publications, p 188, 218, 228 and 267 
12
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13
 Fasulo, Linda M. 2009. An insider's guide to the UN, Yale University Press. p 103 
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Article 42, which states that the Security Council “may take such action by air, sea, or 
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
14
 
This broad mandate makes viable the option to utilize military force to create peace. This 




 The UN maintains several terms for peace, each with its own distinct meaning: 
Table 1- UN Terms for Peace 
Term Definition 
Peace Building Promotion of peace prior to/ or post 
conflict 
Peacemaking The use of diplomacy 
Peace Enforcement The use of some extent of force 
Source: Fasulo, 2009, p108 
Note: The extent of force is often thought of as the differential between hard and soft 
power 
 With so many options at their disposal, the United Nations labels their missions 
based on the actions taken to resolve the conflict. These titles are too vast to mention 
them all, but some examples are transition assistance groups, observer groups, 
verification groups, security forces, protection forces or civilian police missions.
16
 In 
general, all of these require personnel to be on the ground and in direct contact with the 
area of conflict, but not all personnel are armed and usually even the armed forces do not 
engage in offensive actions. Since 1948, there have been 68 UN engagements under the 
peacekeeping umbrella. Fifteen of these engagements are active operations.
17
 Because of 
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 Ibid Pg. 43 
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 United Nations “UN Peacekeeping Operations” www.un.org. December 31, 2013. 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml (accessed February 9, 2014). 
Examples of UN labels for action: UNOSOM: United Nations Operation Somalia, ANAMIR: United 





member state investment with money and lives, it is no surprise that the literature has 
focused on the efficacy of these operations. 
 
Literature Review: 
 Most scholars that have studied and published articles on the effectiveness of UN 
peacekeeping operations have divided their subsets of operations into two periods: from 
1948 through the cold war, and the post-cold war period.
18
  Operations are divided in this 
manner because of the change in global atmosphere pertaining to war during these 
periods. During the cold war most peacekeeping operations were carried out with regards 
to interstate rivals and were directly related to the primary world power focus on the 
containment or spread of diplomacy and communism by the world superpowers.
19
 After 
the cold war we have seen a spike in internal state conflicts and therefore an increase in 
UN intervention because of humanitarian issues.
20
 The post-cold war era can be further 
divided into the period between the cold war and September 11 2001, and post September 
11. These events have also caused a change in the global atmosphere. Literature written 
since 2010, on the efficacy of peacekeeping operations, however, is rather sparse. The 
most recent studies date back to 2008. Technology has also increased the focus on 
peacekeeping as international reporters are often on the front lines of atrocities often 
causing immediate and resounding outcries from society for action. The United Nations 
is seen by many as the most legitimate international organization to carry out these 
operations but is not the only internationally recognized body that has partaken in this 
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 Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis. 2000. International peacebuilding: A theoretical and 
quantitative analysis. American Political Science Review: 779-801. 
19
 Ibid Pg. 786 
20
 Ibid Pg. 786 
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venture. NATO and ECOWAS have both played vital roles in regards to their own 




 Similar to these scholars, I divide the literature into pre-2000 publications and 
post-2000 publications, with the primary focus on the works of post 2000 scholars. Most 
of these authors have conducted in-depth empirical studies on the question of the 
effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations (PKO). I also focus on several authors who 
conducted specific case studies and show the vast difference between the focus on the 
entire body of work compared to the more specific case studies. 
 In 2003, Fortna conducted a study of several of the scholars from the 1980s and 
1990s and found them split two to one on whether peacekeeping had any effect on the 
creation or maintenance of peace.
22
 She also studied some of the authors from early 2000 
and again found them split on the effectiveness, with a third author sitting on the fence 
stating that in some conditions it is effective and in others it is not.
23
 Many scholars from 
the 2000’s also turn to quantitative data to expand upon existing work in order to solve 
this division. Fortna is included in this more recent work (2008) and has shown that 
overall the more recent studies with more robust methodological approaches have shown 
that UN intervention has had a positive effect on the creation of peace.
24
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 Fortna, Virginia Page, and Lise Morjé Howard. "Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping 
Literature*." Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 11 (2008): 283 Pg. 291 
22
 Fortna, Virginia Page 2003. Inside and out: Peacekeeping and the duration of peace after civil and 
interstate wars. International Studies Review 5 (Winter2003): Pg. 100 
23
 Ibid Pg. 100 
24
 Fortna, Virginia Page, and Lise Morjé Howard. "Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping 
Literature*." Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 11 (2008): 283 Pg. 286. 
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 It is important to highlight a key element identified by both Fortna and Sambanis 
and Doyle in regards to their interpretation of peacekeeping operations. In 2000, 
Sambanis and Doyle title the varying types of interventions into four categories:
25
  
 Observer Missions—the integration of unarmed observers charged with ensuring 
the maintenance of an established agreement; 
 Traditional Peacekeeping—which creates a demilitarized zone between warring 
factions; 
 Multidimensional Peacekeeping—which primarily incorporates civilian entities 
that assist with governmental functions like police work, election sanctity or 
economic advice; and  




Fortna utilizes the same definitions to define peacekeeping in both of her studies. 
27
 
However Gilligan and Sergenti do not incorporate any differentiation regarding the types 
of missions which, as I reiterate later, is a flaw within their work. 
 Sambanis and Doyle are some of the first authors to take a quantitative approach 
to measure effective peacekeeping, and they included the heavily active UN intervention 
period of the 1990s. In their study, they focus on civil wars from 1947 to 1997 that have 
included external interjection under the premise of peacekeeping.
28
 Their empirical study 
hinged on the idea of a peace building triangle that incorporated three key elements of 
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 Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis. 2000. International peacebuilding: A theoretical and 
quantitative analysis. American Political Science Review: Pg. 781 
26
 Ibid Pg.781 
27
 Fortna 2003 Pg. 103 2004 Pg. 277 
28
 Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis. 2000. International peacebuilding: A theoretical and 
quantitative analysis. American Political Science Review: 779-801. 
13 
 
Hostility (H), Local Capabilities (LC) and International Capabilities (IC).
29
  They 
represent this via a triangle to represent the possibility of peace, therefore the greater the 
LC and IC in conjunction with lower H, the greater the chance for peace.
30
 In order to 
obtain their data they then look towards quantitative statistics to represent the key 
elements that they have identified as having an effect on peace building. For Hostility (H) 
the statistics they gathered were on death and displacement, conflict type, number of 
faction’s involved, ethnic division and the outcome of the conflict.
31
 For Local 
Capabilities (LC) they gathered data on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), energy 
consumption and resource dependence.
32
 For International Capabilities (IC) they gathered 
data on the type of PKO and the amount of economic assistance.
33
 They even took into 
consideration the cold war period by incorporating the decade in which the conflict 
occurred into their equation.
34
  
 The next step in their progression was to determine the outcomes of the 124 (not 
all interjections were UN operations) conflicts that occurred during the designated period 
of study. They then defined the outcome of each conflict in regards to either strict or 
lenient criteria.
35
 The lenient criteria were an end to violence and the strict criteria was an 
end to violence in conjunction with some increase in democratization.
36
 The results of 
their study showed a mixture of external influences from their data having a direct effect 
on the possibility for peace. For example, they accepted their first hypothesis “The 
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 Ibid Pg. 782 
30
 Ibid Pg. 782 
31
 Ibid Pg. 783 
32
 Ibid Pg. 783 
33
 Ibid Pg. 783 
34
 Ibid Pg. 783 
35
 Ibid Pg. 781 
36
 Ibid Pg. 783 
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probability of peace building (PB) success should be lowered in identity wars”
37
 because 
the data showed a lower PB for both strict and lenient models.
38
 The hypothesis that 
relates to this specific paper is their ninth which states “The probability of PB success is 
higher if UN peace operations are employed.”
39
 Overall the data was split on this 
hypothesis due it showing correlation between UN PKO’s and the potential for peace 
under the strict criteria but not for the lenient criteria.
40
 Overall there were several factors 
that directly affected the possibility of peace building and several that showed no 
correlation. 
There were also several detractors from the findings of Sambanis and Doyle. For 
example, King and Zeng question Sambanis and Doyle’s methodology and argue that the 
necessity for extrapolation of information means that the information is more theory than 
empirical data.
41
 In response to this argument, Sambanis and Doyle defend their position 
by stating that King and Zeng used extreme examples to show their point and failed to 
take the findings as a whole.
42
  
In her study Fortna does not question the methodology but does take the next step 
in the progression of implementing additional quantitative data to show the effectiveness 
of PKO’s. By looking directly at the empirical data that has already been studied, Fortna 
highlights the fact that the data set used only utilizes data from conflicts in which PKO’s 
were implemented.
43
 Fortna’s main argument is that you cannot look at half the equation 
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 Ibid Pg. 783 
38
 Ibid Pg. 783 
39
 Ibid Pg. 785 
40
 Ibid Pg. 789 
41
 Sambanis, Nicholas, and Michael W. Doyle. 2007. No easy choices: Estimating the effects of United 
Nations peacekeeping (response to King and Zeng). International Studies Quarterly 51: 218 
42
  Ibid Pg. 218 
43
 Fortna, Virginia Page. 2004. Does peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the duration 
of peace after civil war. International Studies Quarterly 48: 269-92. 
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but rather need to gather data from both PKO’s that involved intervention and those that 
ran their own course without intervention in order to gauge an accurate assessment of 
effectiveness.
44
 Fortna used the same time period, definition of civil war and even the 
same variables employed by Sambanis and Doyle but expanded her data set to include 
civil conflicts where PKO’s did not interject.
45
 By expanding the data set, Fortna was 
able to correct the criticism that by looking at only the conflicts that are resolved with 
PKO’s you deny the possibility that these conflicts would have resolved without 
intervention.
46
 Fortna’s conclusions, using a “duration analysis” model, showed that the 
implementation of PKO’s does have a significantly positive effect on not only the 
creation of peace but also of the duration of that peace once concord is reached.
47
  
 The next progression of the usage of quantitative data was conducted by Michael 
Gilligan and Ernest Sergenti. This study highlighted flaws in both the methodology for 
Sambanis and Doyle and a flaw in Fortna’s study by claiming that the nonrandom 
assignment of PKO’s requires extrapolation and therefore the evidence cannot be 
empirical.
48
 Basically, the UN is selective about its intervention and therefore the 
selection variables have to be accounted for. In order to correct this flaw they employ a 
comparison methodology in order to pair events with similar variables.
49
 They also 
continue the separation into “a post conflict sample and an in-war sample.”
50
 The results 
disproved Fortna’s hypothesis and showed that UN intervention had little effect on the 
                                                          
44
 Ibid Pg. 273 
45
 Ibid Pg. 278-80 
46
 Ibid Pg. 281 
47
 Ibid Pg. 281 
48
 Gilligan, Michael J., Ernest J. Sergenti, Steven Callander, Robert Urbatsch, Alessandra Casella, Thomas 
Palfrey, and Raymond Riezman. 2008. Do UN interventions cause peace? Using matching to improve 
causal inference. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 3 (2): Pg. 90 
49
 Ibid Pg. 91 
50
 Ibid Pg. 91 
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transition from war to peace in conflict areas.
51
 However the intervention of the UN did 
have an impact on the prolonging of peace after a conflict has been resolved.
52
 This 
research however appears to also be flawed. In order to match conflicts they used several 
variables ranging from Ethnic division to the terrain of the conflict.
53
 What they do not 
appear to take into consideration are the types of missions employed by the UN as Fortna, 
Sambanis and Doyle do. As stated previously many UN missions were vastly different 
from each other. It would be difficult to compare the effectiveness on UN operations 
without acknowledging that Observer Missions (unarmed observers) play a different role 
than Peace Enforcement (armed soldiers using force or the threat of force).  
 The other methodology that has been employed to study the efficacy of UN 
PKO’s is that of the case study. While these studies cannot be replicated and do not 
necessarily conduct comparison to the whole, they do take a close look at specific 
examples and therefore can account for intangibles specific to an event that are difficult 
to quantify because each mission is different. Scholar Shashi Tharoor looked specifically 
for these intangibles that directly affect the outcome of UN operations and found several. 
The primary intangible that was found, relates to the UN mandate under which many of 
the PKO’s are conducted in conjunction with the consent of the warring factions.
54
 This 
often means that the UN must rely on the warring factions in order to operate within their 
space, while at the same time they are attempting to hold this group accountable. The 
author used the PKO’s of Somalia and Yugoslavia to support this flaw; in conjunction 
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 Ibid Pg. 111 
52
 Ibid Pg. 114 
53
 Ibid Pg. 101 
54
 Tharoor, Shashi. 1995. Should UN peacekeeping go ‘back to basics'? Survival 37 (4): Pg. 53 
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with a quote from former Secretary General Boutros-Ghali “If there is not political will 
among the protagonists to solve the problem the United Nations cannot impose peace.”
55
 
 This highlights a proverbial inconsistency with peacekeeping in that the parties to 
peace must adhere to the mandates of the PKO force, while that force, using their arms 
for purely defensive purposes, often does not have the ability to actually enforce these 
mandates.
56
 Another issue that was highlighted was the fact that the UN does not 
maintain any consistent force, therefore when a mandate is passed down from the 
Security Council, the DPKO and DFAS must gather troops and equipment from countries 
that have pledged these things but this does not mean that they will actually grant their 
use when the time comes.
57
 Often it becomes a piecemeal approach of personnel and 
equipment that are not trained together and whose equipment is not compatible.
58
 This 
lends to the issue of interoperability. Tharoor used the metaphor of a fire department 
receiving a call to respond to a fire and then trying to round up the equipment and 
personnel to respond.
59
 In order to correct this deficiency Tharoor presents the option for 
the establishment of a standby force, donated by constituent nations, which answer 
directly to the Security Council.
60
 A detractor to this option is Ramesh Thakur who 
conducted a case study of the Somalia operation.
61
 His main argument is that there needs 
to be a separation between PKO’s and military intervention and that the UN needs to be 
careful, as highlighted the case in Somalia, not to become an international security 
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 I would argue that the transition between the two is rather slim and may be 
crossed without intent and therefore it would be extremely difficult for the UN to 
differentiate between the two. As long as they deploy weapons for defensive purposes 
there is the possibility of engagement, therefore conflict with either party of said conflict 
is possible, even in a defensive posture. This literature does point to my main purpose of 
this study which is to determine if PMSC’s could find utility within UN PKO’s. This will 
be further discussed in the later chapters. 
 The literature has also offered other alternatives to solve some the UN’s 
limitations. Mats Berdal and David Ucko highlight two variable flaws within the UN 
structure and offer a solution to overcome these flaws. The two primary limitations that 
they highlight are ‘resource constraints’ and ‘clarity of political and strategic purposes.’
63
 
In regards to resource constraints the authors cite the UN’s difficulty in establishing a 
cohesive responding force or, once established the inability of the UN or the member 
states to properly equip their forces for the tasked mission.
64
 To support their second UN 
limitation, the authors point to the source of the establishment of UN PKO strategy, the 
UN Security Council, and the division within this entity that leads to a lack of clarity in 
the dissemination of mission direction.
65
 This entity maintains the five permanent 
members and ten elected members, each country maintaining their own geopolitical 
strategies. In order to develop and disseminate direction, consensus is required which also 
requires debate and compromise often leading to inadequate objectives.
66
 This structure 
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makes it difficult for direction to be created and for the forces on the ground to respond to 
the ever changing environment of the PKO. The solution presented by these authors is for 
the establishment of a more robust use of force policy for all Peacekeeping Operations.
67
 
The potential flaw in this argument is that even with a clear policy it is the events on the 
ground that need to determine the use of force and the training of soldiers on when to use 
this force. With so many varying training backgrounds, the implementation of this policy 
could further delay UN response as it is being disseminated to the donated forces. 
While each of these authors has produced invaluable work on the efficacy of 
peacekeeping, I believe that each is missing the forest through the trees. As we have seen 
by the genocides in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda and Darfur, and with the continued 
development of real time news information, the necessity for peacekeeping is not really 
in question. Therefore I would argue that any study of efficacy should not only include 
the empirical data and the specific failures highlighted by case studies but also look at the 
methodologies of successes in order to determine policies that can improve UN 
peacekeeping operations. For this reason I plan on looking at several case studies that 
cover both obvious failures and heralded successes to determine if the current 
establishment for peacekeeping is truly effective at maintaining or creating peace. 
 
Case Study: Somalia 
 In order to look into the efficacy of UN peacekeeping operations one must look at 
both the successes and failures of these operations in order to determine which factors 
contributed to a particular outcome. While empirical data can help to formulate the big 
picture view, there are too many intangibles that can cause the results of PKO’s to 
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change, therefore I do not think that an empirical study is an accurate reflection of 
success or failure. Regardless of this, in order to improve one must look at specific 
scenarios to determine what when right and what went wrong. A peacekeeping operation 
that was a glaring failure and has been memorialized via Hollywood in the movie 
“Blackhawk Down” was the United Nations Mission Somalia (UNOSOM I) and United 
Nations Mission Somalia II (UNOSOM II). 
 The 1991 ousting of dictatorial President Said Barre left a power vacuum within 
Somalia that plunged the country into a civil war.
68
 In a country already separated by 
familial division and clan mentality, these differing factions faced off against each other 
in order to determine the next official leader of the country.
69
 The main players of this 
conflict included the interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and the countries 
Congressional leader, General Mohamed Farad Aidid.
70
 As civil strife waged, part of the 
country was plagued by a severe drought.
71
 This drought, in conjunction with the 
violence, led to a depleted agricultural sector, causing the malnourishment and starvation 
of close to half the population of Somalia, nearly 4.5 million people, with hundreds of 
thousands dead.
72
 This caused the inevitable migration of war stricken Somalis into their 
neighboring countries creating an international crisis prime for UN intervention under 
Chapter VII of their UN Charter.
73
 The UN initiated their involvement via Security 
Council resolution 733 which implemented embargos on the sale of weapons to either 
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parties of the civil conflict.
74
 On March 3, 1992, a cease fire was agreed upon by the 
major parties to the conflict.
75
 The cease fire was soon followed by UN involvement and 
more progressive continuing resolutions, each increasing this involvement: 
Table 2: Major UN Security Council Resolutions Associated with Somalia 
Resolution Date Synopsis 
Security Council Resolution 
733 
1/23/92 Placed embargos on weapons sales to 
Somalia 
Security Council Resolution 
751 
5/24/92 Initiated Peacekeeping monitors 
Security Council Resolution 
767 
6/24/92 Calls for increased security forces 
Security Council Resolution 
775 
7/28/92 Established 4 areas of operations in 
Somalia 
Security Council Resolution 
794 
12/3/92 Establishes the use of Force 
Security Council Resolution 
814 
3/26/93 Changed operations to nation building 
Security Council Resolution 
837 
6/6/93 Reiterates the use of force authorization 
Sources: United Nations, Security Council Resolution 733, 23 January, 1992, retrieved April 2, 2014 from 
http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/733 ;United Nations, Security Council Resolution 751, 24 April 1992, 
retrieved April 2, 2014 from http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/751; United Nations, Security Council 
Resolution 767, 24 July 1992, retrieved April 2, 2014 from http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/767; United 
Nations, Security Council Resolution 775, 28 August 1992, retrieved April 2, 2014 from 
http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/775 ; United Nations, Security Council Resolution 794, 3 December, 1992, 
retrieved April 2, 2014 from http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/794; United Nations, Security Council 
Resolution 814, 26 March 1993, retrieved April 2, 2014 from http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/814; United 
Nations, Security Council Resolution 837, 6 June 1993, retrieved April 2, 2014 from 
http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/837; United Nations, Somalia-UNOSOM I-Background, retrieved April 2, 
2014 from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1backgr2.html 
 The United Nations mandate calls for the enforcement of peace throughout the 
world. They therefore act upon interstate conflicts or civil conflicts that affect the 
international community. In Somalia, the exodus of 800,000 refugees from this war torn 
nation caused international instability catapulting this civil conflict into the purview of 
the United Nations. In order to remain a viable institution, the United Nations is required 
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to view their involvement through the window of potential for creating peace. It is for this 
reason that the UN requires mutual agreement between the parties of the conflict prior to 
initiating peacekeeping operations, “no ‘Blue Helmets’ would be deployed unless all 
parties consented.”
76
 In the situation in Somalia, both parties did sign the “Agreement on 
the implementation of a Ceasefire,”
77
 which called for UN intervention through the 
deployment of observers. This opened the door for UN participation. 
 Security Council resolution 751 initiated armed “boots on the ground” by calling 
for the implementation of personnel who were tasked with monitoring this cease fire, in 
conjunction with a small contingent of personnel to make up a security force in order to 
protect the Non-Government Organizations (NGOs),  and UN humanitarian aid coming 
into the country. This resolution was the impetus for UNOSOM I.
78
 The primary mission 
of the United Nations as carried out by its members, in this case predominately the 
United States, was to provide humanitarian aid to the millions of starving Somali 
citizens.
79
 This action was labeled Operation Restore Hope.
80
 The warring factions 
however began to intercept these shipments and began using them as currency for their 
own purposes, like continuing the fight for power. This established the ultimatum for the 
United Nations, either cut their losses and leave or provide armed forces to keep the 
shipments of humanitarian aid secure.
81
 The above mentioned resolutions continued to 
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escalate the numbers of UN PKO forces, eventually reaching around 37,000 soldiers.
82
  
As hostilities mounted, there were minor clashes between Peacekeeping forces and the 
local militias. The hostilities lead the UN to clearly delineate the “any means necessary” 
clause of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and essentially authorize the use of force.
83
 
Along with this change, from a security element to a military force, came the 




 UNISOM I, with UNITAF, remained a humanitarian mission of providing food to 
those in need. The United Nations soon conceded that this was insufficient to stabilize the 
country, which leads to the transition to UNISOM II. The primary shift of these two 
operations was from a humanitarian mission to a nation building mission; this included 
the stabilization of the political and economic realms and the maintenance of order via 
police activities.
85
 This facilitated the implementation of a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) 
which consisted of elite special operations forces from the US military to include Army 
Rangers and Special Forces operators.
86
 These teams deployed to respond to potential 
areas of conflict, in force, and provide security operations. This group also conducted 
offensive police style actions like the attempts to arrest General Aidid, which lead to the 
“Blackhawk Down” fiasco.  
 These offensive actions changed the scope of the mission from Peacekeeping to 
Peace Enforcement. Many scholars like to differentiate between these two actions, as 
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Thakur states “Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are not synonymous.”
87
 This is 
understandable since Peacekeeping operations are defined as purely defensive actions 
that, while utilizing the threat of force, don’t actually engage in any action. Peace 
Enforcement on the other hand does call for military actions that can be both offensive 
and defensive in scope. However these actions are not as different as many would claim 
as they can transition between each other very quickly and often not under the control of 
the peacekeeping force. UNISOM II was Peacekeeping until the actions of General Aidid 
changed the role of the PKO forces by attacking UN forces in order to control the 
humanitarian aid. In my opinion, the dynamic nature of these two labels requires that they 
be one and the same. 
 
Case Study: Sierra Leone 
 In 1991, civil conflict was initiated in Sierra Leone when an armed insurgent 
group known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), fueled by years of corrupt 
patrimonial government and a disenfranchised youth base, initiated attacks on 
government entities. This group was also supported by the government of Liberia.
88
 This 
brought government forces, with the assistance of an “Observer Group (ECOMOG) of 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)”
89
 into a protracted civil 
war. In total, it is estimated that approximately 75,000 people were killed in this conflict 
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and at least a million people were displaced, with ten percent of the population fleeing the 
country and becoming refugees.
90
  
The international impact of the civil war brought the conflict into the purview of 
the United Nations mandate.  Initially, United Nations intervention was relegated to 
negotiation assistance that assisted in the democratic elections in 1996, however the RUF 
refused to recognize the election results as legitimate and therefore the violence did not 
subside.
91
 In 1996, the UN was also able to successfully broker a peace deal known as the 
Adidjan Accord but this was short lived. In 1997, the accords broke down when the RUF 
joined with the government’s military Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) to 
initiate a coup.
92
 The Adidjan Accord, however, did satisfy some of the causes for the 
war, allowed for amnesty to the leadership, a contentious concession, and laid the 
groundwork for the disarmament of both parties.
93
  
Negotiations continued with the Conakry Accord that called for a six month 
ceasefire and allowed for the inclusion of both parties via representatives to a temporary 
government structure however the RUF refused to implement this agreement.
94
 In 1998, 
under the shadow of heightened violence, the UN, with the assistance of the initial 
contact group, to include the British US contingents, were able to broker the Lome Peace 
Agreement which built upon the Abidjan Accord but focused more on the “distribution of 
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power between the government and the RUF.”
95
 This agreement was rife with 
controversy in that it granted amnesty to the perpetrators of humanitarian atrocities like 
rape and murder by RUF forces.
96
 An important aspect of the Lome agreement was the 
incorporation of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) 
which placed UN representatives on the ground in 1998 and eventually turned into the 
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 1999, which culminated in close 




Similar to Somalia, the United Nations also gave these forces teeth by authorizing 
the use of force under their UN Chapter VII authority.
98
 These forces were not an 
instantaneous success with several rather embarrassing events to include the capture of 
500 UN security forces personnel due to a lack of training, equipment and clear UN 
mandates, however eventually their presence did help facilitate the ceasefires in both 
2000 and 2001in the Abuja I and II agreements.
99
 The UN however was not the only 
entity involved in this mission, similarly to the intervention in Somalia; British forces 
worked in conjunction with UN forces and often stemmed the tide of potential failure.
100
  
The UN operations had several setbacks throughout its implementation with one 
of the main problems being the organizations inability to gather the necessary troops and 
equipment for the response. In actuality the UN mission was on the verge of failure when 
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RUF forces laid siege to the capital of Freetown had it not been for the intervention of 
British forces with Operation Polliser.
101
 The British did not however join the UN force 
but rather leaned on the protection of their citizens, the humanitarian crisis, the need to 
ensure the UN did not fail and the support of democracy to justify their intervention.
102
 It 
is actually hypothesized that the US and UK did not provide the UN with personnel due 
to the belief that their organization was insufficient and that they could be more effective 
outside of the UN structure.
103
 The British did however work closely with the UN and 




Prior to the British intervention the UN had tried to establish a QRF similar to 
what was in Somalia but could not obtain the troops and supplies for such an entity from 
with the US or the UK.
105
 This lack of western support was actually the motivation for 
the withdrawal of soldiers from both India and Jordan which significantly depleted the 
UNAMSIL force and precipitated the resignation of the UN commander Major General 
Jetley.
106
 All of these force interoperability issues lead to the slow progress with the UN 
mission that caused continued delays in the democratization process.  
The UN did however start to have success under a new command which was 
facilitated by mission clarification and a focus by the UN on increasing the UN forces 
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 This eventually led to one of the largest UN intervention force in 
history at 17,500 soldiers from 31 countries, with also included additional personnel for a 




The current situation is one of relative stability, even with the removal of UN 
Peace Keeping forces, but what has remained is a UN presence through the United 
Nations Integrated Peace building Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL).
109
 The ceasefires 
have held as well under the fundamental principles of peace established by the Lome 
agreement, which has allowed for two democratically based elections since the end of the 
conflict.
110
 This democratization could not have occurred if the UN had not met several 
of their goals which lend credence to the contention that, overall UNAMSIL was a 
success. The UN mission was able to extend the influence of the Sierra Leon Government 
throughout the country, established a credible political process, and trained and provided 
support for both the Sierra Leone Army and Police.
111
 Most importantly the UN was able 
to establish a successful Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration program that 
has successful reintegrated close to 46,000 RUF soldiers.
112
 
 Throughout this conflict the United Nations worked closely with the ECOWAS 
forces that were made up of predominantly Nigerian forces but also soldiers from Ghana, 
Guinea and Mali, neighboring nations that had a vested interest in the stabilization of 
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Sierra Leone because the refugees were becoming a burden to their nation.
113
 Eventually 
the UN took the side of these forces with the Sierra Leone government against the RUF 
and AFRC. The United Nations took a progressive stance from bipartisan negotiators to 
observers to eventually siding with one side. They chose the side focused on peace, 
remaining flexible to the conditions and responsive to the changing atmosphere of the 
conflict. This can be viewed through the progression of UN mandates: 
Table 3: Major UN Security Council Resolutions Associated with Sierra Leone 
Resolution Date Synopsis 
Security Council Resolution 1132 10/8/97 Arms embargo against both parties of conflict  
Security Council Resolution 1181 6/13/98 Implementation of UNOMSIL 
Security Council Resolution 1270 10/22/99 Creation of UNAMSIL 
Security Council Resolution 1346 3/30/01 Max UN forces 17, 500 
Security Council Resolution 1492 6/18/03 Initial troop drawdown 
Security Council Resolution 1829 7/4/08 Creation of UNIPSIL 
Sources: United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1132, 8 October 1997, retrieved April 25, 2014 from 
http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1132; United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1181, 13 July 1998, 
retrieved April 25, 2014 from http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1181; United Nations, Security Council 
Resolution 1270, 22 October 1999, retrieved April 25, 2014 from 
http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1270; United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1346, 30 March 
2001, retrieved April 25, 2014 from http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1346; United Nations, Security 
Council Resolution 1492, 18 July 2003, retrieved April 25, 2014 from 
http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1492; United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1829, 4 August 
2008, retrieved April 25, 2014 from http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1829 
However it was the eventual establishment of overwhelming force, 17500 soldiers, that 
has helped to create the level of necessary stability that gives the Sierra Leone 
government the chance at success. 
Executive Outcomes:  
An analysis of Sierra Leone, in the scope of this paper about the potential utility 
of PMSC’s in UN PKO’s, would be incomplete without taking a look at the role that the 
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PMSC Executive Outcomes played in the Sierra Leone civil war. It is important to 
distinguish that this organization, based on the UN definition, is truly a mercenary 
organization that conducts offensive military operations for their client for monetary 
compensation. Therefore this type of utility is not what this paper intends to establish. 
Instead this paper intends to observe whether or not PMSC’s could potentially replace the 
international Peace Keeping forces as a viable option for UN deployment in Peace 
Keeping operations or as a force multiplier and to fill in the potential shortcomings that 
were highlighted in the previous case studies. The differential between these may not be 
clear to most; however it is my contention that the most important aspect of diversion 
between these two types of entities (mercenary vs PMSC organizations) is the mandate 
for offensive versus defensive military style operations. This is similar to the vague 
distinction between UN peacekeeping and police operations that utilize force and 
unilateral actions taken by a country to remove a government entity. For example, US 
police style actions in arresting General Aidid for violations of International 
Humanitarian laws vs the US led coalition that invaded Iraq and toppled Saddam 
Hussein. Basically “EO offers to do what the United Nations blue helmets cannot and 




Executive Outcomes (EO) was a South African Private Military Security 
Company (PMSC) that played a significant role in the history of Sierra Leone from 1995 
to 1997, prior to UNAMSIL, which gives us a glimpse into the potential utility of these 
organizations in peacekeeping operations. The EO forces in Sierra Leone consisted of 
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approximately 2000 former soldiers of the South African Defense Force (SADF) who had 
been tested in counter insurgency operations.
115
 
During their contract period, EO provided everything from training services for 
the Sierra Leone Army, technical services, intelligence gathering and proactive military 
engagements against the RUF.
116
 There services included the following: 
“an air attack wing, logistical supplies, a small medical corp, weapons and 
equipment procurement, technical support systems, strategic, aerial, tactical and 
counterintelligence sections, infiltration of enemy or rival groups, sophisticated 
surveillance capabilities, demolition, demining and associated engineering 
services recruitment of personnel and of course, financing”
117
 
EO offered their own equipment that was far more sophisticated than what the Sierra 
Leone Army or the RUF could field to include MiG Fighters and MI Helicopters.
118
 Their 
roles within this contract were to protect the capital of Freetown, train the military and 
push the RUF out of several of the mining areas in Sierra Leone. In order to accomplish 
these objectives EO enlisted the assistance of the Kamajors, a Sierra Leone hunting 
organization, training up to 10,000 of these militia members to carry out their missions.
119
 
Towards these goals EO was greatly effective and there was a short lived period of 
relative stability during their tenure.  In 1996 their presence did allow for democratic 
elections that placed President Kabbah into power, however the overall legitimacy of 
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these elections is questionable as the Sierra Leone government did not have control over 
a majority of the country therefore most citizens were unable to cast a vote.
120
  
While they maintained success during their presence, which points to at least a 
semblance of effectiveness, there remains a great deal of fodder for detractors of the use 
of PMSC’s from this engagement. There is little question that the motivation behind EO’s 
involvement in Sierra Leone was financially based. Not just from the payment for 
services but also for the granting of rights and contracts for mining that went to 
corporations that maintained close ties to EO like Branch Mining.
121
 It is even alleged 
that Branch may have financed EO during this operation as the Sierra Leone government 
did not have the finances to pay for their services.
122
 Also shortly after the end of their 
contract and subsequent departure from the country, the same Sierra Leone soldiers that 
they had trained were an integral part of the coup, in conjunction with the RUF, that 
ousted the democratically elected President. 
In response to this organization South Africa drafted legislation, the South 
African Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Bill, which regulated and required EO 
to obtain authorization for paramilitary activities outside of South Africa.
123
 This 
ultimately was the end of EO as an organization, which disbanded in 1999, however they 
appear to have shifted their operations to a shared organization Sandline, a British 
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corporation that has subcontracted EO employees and maintains ties to many of the same 
companies that EO did.
124
 
Based on the success of EO in Sierra Leone and other areas of Africa (Angola) 
the potential utility of this type of organization was not lost on several international 
entities. EO did attempt to sell their services directly to the UN claiming to be able to “do 
a better job that the UN for 10 percent of the cost.”
125
 They have also been also been 
looked by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as a potential asset for peacekeeping 
operations within Africa.
126
 In regards to their other services, they have also been 
contracted to NGO’s conducting humanitarian missions and other protection services. 
During their tenure EO did realize that they needed to present the aura of legitimacy in 
order to garner the support of the international community. They tried to accomplish this 
by claiming to only be contracted to internationally recognized governments while 
providing intelligence to the international community.
127
 Despite these attempts at 
legitimacy they were never able to shake the stigma of being a mercenary organization 
within the eyes of the international community. 
Analysis: Somalia 
 The UN mandate of pursing peace was not the outcome of the Somalia operation. 
Their humanitarian efforts were thwarted by armed militias bent on securing their 
positions of power within the country. The actions of these parties required the UN to 
protect their representatives via force as necessary and as allowed by the UN Charter. 
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The end result of this UN Peacekeeping Operation was not the creation of peace and 
stability, therefore it can be clearly articulated that this operation was not a success, 
especially as US forces vacated the country while a resolution was nowhere in sight.
128
 
So why did this operation fail? After looking at the historical perspective of the events it 
becomes clear that this operation was a cascading failure from the very beginning.  
 The first error that is often highlighted is the division of command. The operation 
was initiated by the United States led proxy coalition of United Nations forces under US 
command.
129
 This initial operation was charged with securing the ports and humanitarian 
aid transports.
130
 The United Nations was supposed to take command of the operation 
after only a short period of time however as things began to deteriorate, the United 
Nations did not assume control and the United States forces refused to be placed under 
UN command.
131
 This division between the command elements caused confusion during 
operations as neither entity was communicating effectively. 
 Not only were the command structures in country not communicating, there were 
also differences of opinion between the Secretary General and the President of the United 
States.
132
 At the time of this operation the office of the US President was in transition 
between incumbent President George Bush Sr. and President Elect Clinton.
133
 Therefore 
there was also a transition in foreign policy perspectives between presidencies.
134
 The 
initial force agreement between the United States and the United Nations was for the US 
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to provide an initial overwhelming force, designed to secure the ability to provide 
humanitarian aid, and then be transitioned to the UN for sustainment and monitoring. 
135
 
 As the President of the United States transitioned; so too did the UN’s mission—
from a humanitarian aid mission to a nation building operation.
136
 What did not change 
was the mechanism used to implement the operation. In general, the military is not 
designed to build a nation, even Special Operations Forces. Instead, it is meant to act as a 
hammer not a scalpel. In other words, soldiers engage a situation with force, while nation 
building requires the more precise actions similar to a surgeon. Nation building requires 
more than soldiers, it requires police, economic and political experts, and critical 
infrastructure specialists. This is too difficult to accomplish with the current structure of 
our armed forces. 
 The United Nations bases their peacekeeping actions on the premise of 
maintaining neutrality.
137
 Like a majority of their missions they waited until they had a 
signed agreement by both parties before becoming engaged in the conflict.
138
 However, 
once they were on the ground, the actions of General Aidid, facilitated by some actions 
by US and UN forces, quickly blurred the lines of neutrality. After General Aidid’s forces 
attacked and killed 24 Pakistani members of the UN coalition, an arrest order was created 
for Aidid.
139
 This in essence placed US and UN forces against one of the major parties of 
the civil war, ending hopes for continued neutrality.  
                                                          
135
 Ibid Pg. 58 
136
 Ibid Pg. 61 
137
 Clarke, Walter, and Jeffrey Herbst. 1996. Somalia and the future of humanitarian intervention. Foreign 
Aff. 75 : 70. 
138
 Thakur, Ramesh. 1994. From peacekeeping to peace enforcement: The UN operation in 
Somalia. Journal of Modern African Studies: 388 
139
 Clarke, Walter, and Jeffrey Herbst. 1996. Somalia and the future of humanitarian intervention. Foreign 
Affairs. 75 : 79 
36 
 
 In its effort to maintain neutrality, US and UN forces made a grievous 
miscalculation by not attempting to disarm the warring factions.
140
 It was even clear in 
retrospect that many members of the two factions were actually anticipating disarmament 
upon signing the agreement.
141
 The failure of the peacekeepers to push this issue allowed 
for the continued degradation of the mission as General Aidid and his followers remained 
powerful enough to counter the US/UN forces attempting to quell their actions. 
 The mission to assist the people of Somalia was a noble endeavor within the 
scope and mandate of the United Nations. It was an international crisis that could have 
been helped with a clear and focused operational order with a clearly delineated 
command structure. This operation had neither of these fundamental aspects of United 
Nations Peacekeeping operations. These in conjunction with the PKO forces failure to 
disarm or maintain a neutral stance doomed the operation from the beginning. The 
lessons of UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II can be reviewed and carried forward in order to 
aid future operations. 
Analysis: Sierra Leone 
 The opposite spectrum required for determining efficacy is to observe what 
actions lead to the success of an operation. Success of course is relative as Sierra Leone 
remains mired in the quagmire of a failed state by definition; however their movements 
on the failed state list from number six from the bottom to the top failed state, on the 
precipice of moving from the “alert category” to the “warning category”, shows marked 
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 In conjunction with this change in status, Sierra Leone has gone from a 
ten year protracted civil war to a stage of relative stability during which two successful 
elections have been held which even changed the balance of power between two political 
parties without a regression back to violence.
143
 During the civil war most critical 
infrastructure was destroyed leaving the people of Sierra Leone without access to clean 
water, medical supplies or education. Post-civil war, the international community has 
implemented programs to start to correct this and has provided millions of dollars in aid 
to this country which has assisted in the development of community projects to support 
the people and provide for their basic needs.
144
 In addition to this, numerous programs 
have sought to advance the state away from international dependence through the 
implementation of agricultural programs, economic programs, education programs and 
judicial oversight programs.
145
 So while not able to stand on their own yet, Sierra Leone 
has showed vast improvements lending to the international community’s views of this 
intervention being an overall success. 
 The Sierra Leone mission was a success for a variety of reasons. They were able 
to disarm a large contingent of the rebel forces and then re-integrate them back into 
normal society.
146
 The United Nations was able to detain the initial RUF leader, Fadoy 
Sankoh, who had no interest in the peace process, which allowed for more receptive 
                                                          
142
 Bah, Abu Bakarr. 2013. The contours of new humanitarianism: War and peacebuilding in Sierra 
Leone. Africa Today 60: 2-26. 
143
 Ibid Pg. 19 
144
 Ibid Pg. 19 
145
 Ibid Pg. 20 
146
 Badmus, Isiaka Alani, and 'Dele Ogunmola. 2009. Towards rebuilding a failed state: The United Nations 




leadership to take over control of the RUF.
147
 The UN allowed for the initial distribution 
of power between the civilian government and the RUF and then assisted in the transition 
of the RUF to a political party, thereby affording them the potential for continued power 
thru the democratic process.
148
 The member nations of the ECOWAS group maintained a 
vested interest in the success of the mission; therefore failure was not an option, even 
though the mission was bailed out by the British on multiple occasions. The mission itself 
was more than just a military operation; the United Nations also focused skilled elements 
of the response that were charged with peace building.
149
 They did not rely on soldiers to 
carry out this fundamental aspect of the peacekeeping process. Most importantly when 
faced with adversity the UN responded with continued resilience that allowed for 
increased funds, increased troop strength and continued focus from the United Nations as 
observed by the progression of UN Security Council resolutions.  
Comparative Analysis: 
 There are several similarities between the failure in Somalia and the success of 
Sierra Leone, both before intervention and after, which allows for a valid comparison to 
the key factors in the United Nations responses that may be extrapolated to determine 
why one campaign was successful while the other was not. Both nations are African 
coastal cities on relatively parallel lines of delimitation but opposite coasts of the African 
continent. The catalyst for both civil wars has been tied to corruption in the incumbent 
dictatorial government structures which lead to dis-satisfied factions within each nation 
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and eventually lead to the ousting of their presidents.
150
 Both wars were allowed to 
continue for years prior to United Nations intervention leaving very little critical 
infrastructure remaining that had not been affected by the violence.  
 In regards to the response, both elements maintained divided leadership structures 
and both eventually developed a chapter VII mandate that authorized UN forces to use 
whatever means necessary to protect the civilian populations and themselves. There were 
even significant crescendo events that lead the intervening parties to take sides. In 
Somalia it was the deaths of the Pakistan UN soldiers and in Sierra Leone it was the 
detainment of 500 UN soldiers. During both interventions the UN eventually took sides 
against one party to the conflict, in Somalia it was against General Aidid and his forces, 
in Sierra Leone it was against Sankoh and the RUF.  
 Based on this review several of the key elements of the Somalia failure also 
existed as factors and yet Sierra Leone is determined to be a success. Therefore there 
must have been steps implemented during the Sierra Leone mission that mitigated the 
factors that lead to the failure of the Somalia mission. One could extrapolate from this 
that if key strategies had been altered during the Somalia campaign, the outcome may 
have been different. One of these events could have been the successful capture of 
General Aidid. If he had been replaced by more cooperative members, negotiation could 
have taken place, similar to what occurred in Sierra Leone. If the United States forces had 
been more vested in the outcome of the conflict like the ECOWAS forces were maybe 
they would have been able to persevere once faced with adversity. Instead of 
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withdrawing the forces a surge could have turned the tide. In Somalia, if the UN and US 
forces could have worked under a more unified command similar or at least worked in 
better conjunction with each other, like the UN, British and the ECOWAS forces. If the 
UN forces had pushed for the disarmament of rebel forces in Somalia, as they had 
expected, would this have turned the tide? Most importantly however, based on my 
opinion, was the implementation of UN personnel that differentiated between the mission 
of security and the mission peace building. By allowing soldiers to conduct security, 
while allocating experts in their fields to the developing of the nation and critical 
infrastructure, the UN was able to promote a successful Peacekeeping and Nation 
Building endeavor. 
 
UN Limitations and the Utility of PMSC’s: 
 Within the aforementioned case studies there are several examples of UN 
limitations that may be remedied by the incorporation of PMSC’s into the UN PKO 
response. In both case studies we observed a unity of command issue. For the Somalia 
operation the United States acted outside of the UN chain of command but what appears 
to have amplified the apparent command structure issues was a lack of communication. 
The US acted independently and did not communicate their missions or intent to their UN 
counterparts. In the Sierra Leone case study the British also did not fall within the UN 
command structure however they did embed British liaison officers within the UN 
structure in order to share information and strategy.
151
 Within both case studies we also 
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observe a multinational UN response force which leads to obvious interoperability issues 
regarding communications, training structures and equipment variations. The use of 
PMSC’s would resolve the command structure issue as they answer directly to the client 
and therefore cannot work outside the scope of their contract with them. While the 
personnel hired by PMSC’s may have varying backgrounds and ethnicities, like with 
Executive Outcomes, there is a vast pool of similarly trained former soldiers from which 
these companies could draw, it would be incumbent upon the United Nations contract to 
set the standards of minimum training for any PMSC utilized similar to the Worldwide 
Protective Services (WPS) standards implemented by the Department of State for their 
overseas contracts. The use of PMSC’s would also solve the standardization of 
equipment issues and as seen by EO, often PMSC equipment is vastly superior to some of 
the member countries who currently make up the UN Peace keeping force. In the Sierra 
Leone response it was observed that the UN had difficulty obtaining sufficient support 
from member states. The support that did come was slow to activate and prepare delaying 
the UN response.
152
 Once on the ground several member states subsequently withdrew 
their support when events on the ground or back in their country changed. In Sierra 
Leone we observed the Nigerians depart when their newly elected government could no 
longer garner support for the mission.
153
 We also observed both India and Jordan 
withdrawal due to a lack of western involvement.
154
 In Somalia we of course see the 
United States withdrawal after the failed capture of General Aidid and the subsequent 
loss of American lives associated with this mission. The deployment of PMSCs would 
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ensure a level of stability within the UN response as the contract would stipulate the 
conditions for departure not elements outside the control of the UN. With the EO 
example we observed the speed with which PMSC’s could respond to a crisis, with this 
organization operating their private air support and transportation elements. 
 Within both the Somalia mission and the Sierra Leone mission we observe the 
need for flexibility to the changing environment on the ground. The United States 
implemented a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) that could respond to emergencies as they 
arose with overwhelming force. The UN also observed the need for this type of element 
within the Sierra Leone response and attempted to form a Rapid Reaction Force but could 
not garner the support of the US or UK for this element.
155
 Had it not been for the 
surprising deployment of British soldiers as a de-facto QRF during the RUF attack on 
Freetown, the UN mission may have failed. The quick response ability of PMSC’s could 
be utilized by the UN as a QRF or as a force multiplier if the mission begins to 
deteriorate. Throughout both UN missions there are potential utilities for PMSC’s that 
could potentially aid future UN peacekeeping operations meaning that the discussion for 
the utilization of PMSC’s should not be readily dismissed without a full review of their 
potential utility. 
Conclusion: 
 In regards to UN Peace Keeping operations there appears to be a rather thin line 
between success and failure. It appears based, on the two case examples reviewed above, 
that a minor change in events or strategies can make the difference between utter failure 
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and total success. What can be derived from this study is that the United Nations must 
continue to learn from their past operations, what works and what does not, in order to 
prepare for future intervention. We can also see a several potential avenues of utility for 
PMSC’s in future UN PKO responses. Both of the above studied operations were noble, 
necessary and fell within the mandate of the United Nations. Going forward the keys to 
any operation will be flexibility to the changing environment and dedicated support for 















III. UN Peace Building 
"UN peacekeeping operations are now increasingly complex and multi-dimensional, 
going beyond monitoring a ceasefire to actually bringing failed States back to life, often 
after decades of conflict. The blue helmets and their civilian colleagues work together to 
organize elections, enact police and judicial reform, promote and protect human rights, 
conduct mine-clearance, advance gender equality, achieve the voluntary disarmament of 
former combatants, and support the return of refugees and displaced people to their 




According to the United Nations, as of early 2015, there are sixteen ongoing 
peacekeeping operations in countries that are involved in a civil conflict or have only 
recently established a semblance of unstable peace that will require external assistance in 
order to stabilize their state.
156
 Civil conflicts within a state will destroy critical 
infrastructure, weaken public services, and force the relocation of its citizens who either 
become refugees in a foreign state or Internally Displaced Persons (IDP).  In short, these 
nation states are in turmoil. It is therefore imperative that any fledging peace accord be 
supported by the international community both financially and with Subject Matter 
Experts (SME) on the ground, in order to establish the long term stability that is the 
ultimate goal of peacekeeping operations.  
When studying peacekeeping operations many scholars look predominantly at the 
effectiveness of the operation in and of itself. I don’t think that this is a viable approach. 
It is my argument that both peacekeeping operations during civil conflict and peace 
building post conflict are synonymous with each other.  This does not mean that the two 
processes will not sometimes be in conflict with each other; however a responsible 
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international community cannot intervene solely for the purpose of ending the conflict 
without also taking responsibility for the natural vacuum that occur’ s post conflict. For 
that reason in this chapter I will begin to look at the natural progression of peacekeeping 
intervention which is peace building.  
Some authors have actually differentiated international intervention into three 
distinct processes, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and state/nation building. This was 
initially highlighted with United Nations Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in 
his 1992 report “An Agenda for Peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and 
peacekeeping.”
157
 In this report the Secretary General distinguishes between 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding.
158
 Many authors have then built on this to include the 
idea of nation or state building as the continuation of these stages for peace. While 
distinct, these processes often overlap each other and can be in conflict with each other. 
A viable concession to facilitate peace may also lead to long term instability and erode 
the state building process. As a caveat to this however, many authors do use the terms 
nation building and peacebuilding interchangeably, therefore when reviewing the 
literature on the subject it was necessary to identify the processes that were being 
described and fit them into one of the three stages. For this paper I will also look at 
peacebuilding and nation building interchangeably as they are both the natural 
progression of peacekeeping as described in the previous chapter. However, I will 
initially differentiate between the two in order to highlight their subtle differences. 
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 As discussed in the previous chapter, peacekeeping operations are narrowly 
focused on maintaining the peace via negotiated peacekeeping agreements and observer 
missions that ensure adherence to these agreements. This often requires use of force 
procedures that are predominately police style operations, something most military forces 
are not specifically geared towards or trained for. This intervention also requires mutual 
concession by the warring factions; therefore some level of hostilities will still exist.  
Peace building is the next step that occurs once peace has been established and is 
initiated by both parties agreeing to the democratic process. This will include the 
disarmament of the warring parties, which is vital to establishing long term peace since it 
limits the faction’s ability to easily return to conflict. The members of the conflict parties 
then need to be identified and reintegrated back into civil society. One of the problems 
that occur with this is the concurrent need for justice. Often the same soldiers who are 
being reintegrated into society also carried out the humanitarian crisis that lead to 
international intervention. The power during the civil conflict rested in the warring 
parties, not in the civilian population who are the victims. It is therefore vital for this 
balance of power to be relocated with the civilians. The primary international process for 
this reallocation of power has been through democratic elections. This requires the 
inclusion of both factions and the ability of other party representatives to be given the 
opportunity to represent their constituents within the new governmental structure. One of 
the primary methods that the United Nations has assisted these fragile states with this is 
through their program that assists with the development of a Constitution that establishes 
the rights of the people.
159
 Author Vijayashri Sripati argues that this involvement is 
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actually an extension of the desires of international corporations, citing the clauses in the 
recent Iraq and Afghanistan Constitutions that ensure open markets within these states.
160
 
While this may be true, the fragile status of any state recently removed from civil conflict 
may not have the ability or knowledge to develop a viable constitution and therefore 
United Nations assistance programs are vital to the this process. The key to ensuring the 
legitimacy of this process is the ultimate ratification of the Constitution by the newly 
elected government.  
Nation or State building can be differentiated from peace building because it is 
the process of turning over the running of the state to those states governmental 
institutions that are developed during peacebuilding. State building therefore looks at the 
overarching pillars required for a government to move a country from a fragile state to a 
legitimate stable nation. These pillars are security, social and economic wellbeing, justice 
and reconciliation and governance and participation.
161
 Once a state’s leadership has 
developed the institutions to carry out these tasks and is able to fulfill these pillars, the 
international community can begin to transition from welfare to partnership. Security is 
the first pillar because it is required prior to being able to focus on the establishment of 
any of the other pillars. As long as violence and conflict remain there can be no social or 
economic reform. It will also displace the focus of law enforcement and the justice 
system that will not be able to provide a secure environment or address crime. Finally as 
long as conflict ensues the government will not be viewed as legitimate and the citizens 
will not feel comfortable participating in the process.  
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One of the primary catalysts for conflict is uncontrollable poverty and poor 
economic structures of governments usually fueled by leaders focused on their own self 
interests. In order to transition the state out of international aid it is vital for the 
government to establish laws that govern business, revive agriculture and the physical 
infrastructure required for investment. This includes roads, airports, and public 
utilities.
162
 One of the most important institutions will need to be the tax policy and 
collection department to bring in revenue that can be utilized to carry out these functions. 
The government will need to ensure that policies are in place that allow for a free market 
economy and lead to development, lowering unemployment and poverty within the 
state.
163
 Prior to achieving this economic ability it is vital for the international community 
to provide funds that can jump start these basic functions. However it is just as vital to 
ensure that the unstable government institutions are involved in this process so that the 
nation does not begin to rely solely on external funding without establishing the 
infrastructure necessary to carry these tasks out themselves. 
The law enforcement and justice system ensures the safety and security of the 
citizens of a nation. Often conflict states justice systems are maintained by the military 
and accountable only to the government. El Salvador’s pre intervention system is an 
example of this.
164
 During the peacebuilding process it is vital to create the infrastructure 
to train and support a law enforcement community that is accountable to the people of 
that state. This will require external support, training, equipment, facilities and funds to 
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establish. The legal system itself may need to be revamped in order to push out any 
imbedded corruption.  
Lastly the government structures that were eroded by the conflict need to be re-
established or created from the beginning. This includes the electoral system to ensure 
their legitimacy and accountability, and the public service infrastructure that can provide 
the necessary functions to aid the civilian population. Border patrol programs, military 
defense, and enforcement divisions that maintain order all have to be created and trained. 
Even the basic structure of the government that allows for the checks and balances of 
each other but are able to pass laws and programs needs to be established. 
 There are several international organizations that play important roles within the 
peacebuilding process. Most of these organizations maintain western style philosophy’s 
of liberalism and democratic viability as their fundamental ethos.  Some of these 
organizations are the United Nations, which maintains several divisions for peacebuilding 
like United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
165
 There are also other entities like 
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other subsidiaries like the 
North American Treaty Organization (NATO). While these organizations do maintain 




One of the obvious goals of peace building is to reach a level of success that 
justifies the expense by the international community. Of course there are also 
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humanitarian incentives for the International community to act as well; however, as we 
have seen in Rwanda, the international community often acts either too late or too little to 
actually thwart the humanitarian atrocities. This motivation is more closely linked to the 
expense of peacekeeping operations, not peace building. Taken from a realist perspective, 
the potential for success is an attributing factor to the motivation for donor countries to 
act. This is in conjunction with more self-interested purposes like their own domestic 
security, for example international terrorism, or access to natural resources. There are 
several measures of success but one in particular encompasses and simplifies the overall 
measure into three parts, maximalist, minimalist and moderate.
167
 The maximalist 
approach seeks to solve the causes of the conflict.
168
 This can be extremely difficult 
especially when the causes are embedded in years of conflict or ethnicity. Other issues, 
like poverty, can be addressed through donations and programs that put the conflict 
participants to work. The minimalist approach would be the implementation of the least 
number of programs in order to simply maintain the peace.
169
 This is often done during 
peacekeeping operations when compromise and negotiation are keys to success and the 
potential for a lasting peace is moderate at best. The moderate barometer is usually the 
most likely as donor countries often fail to commit the necessary funds to address the root 
causes of conflict. The moderate measure goes beyond just maintaining the peace to 
address the sustainability of the nation itself.
170
 It is within this measure that we find 
peace building. 
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Author Alina Menocal takes a close look at the relationship between 
peacebuilding and state building and argues that their relationship can be both supportive 
and contradictory at the same time. She acknowledges that both require the intervention 
of international players like the United Nations, powerful states like the United States or 
Europe and International financial entities like the World Bank. She also argues that the 
key component of this intervention is the creation of the link between the established 
government and the rest of society; therefore there must be both a top down and bottom 
up approach.
171
 This is the fundamental goal of nation building, the establishment of 
infrastructure, security and justice, government entities, humanitarian rights, social 
programs etc., which permanently links these two entities. This linkage will establish the 
legitimacy of the government leading to long term stability. The international players 
therefore must ensure that the state incorporates the members of society who were 
oppressed or did not play a role in the previous state, which also fostered the conflict. In 
peacebuilding, the establishment of a Constitution and democratic elections, are all vital 
in developing this. Therefore, peacebuilding and nation building are synonymous with 
each other.  
Menocal also highlights the potential tensions between these two with four main 
points. First is that the development of the state may not actually lead to sustained 
peace.
172
 The development of peace requires concessions between the conflict parties. 
Outside interveners may also have ulterior motives for their involvement. Their own 
domestic security or the securities of natural resources are examples of this. This means 
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that there are often winners and losers in the process which is usually the catalyst for 
continued conflict. Second the requirements for peacebuilding may conflict with the 
legitimacy needed for nation building. The inclusion of all entities, to include the parties 
to the conflict, in the newly formed government is a key to establishing peace, however, 
the inclusion of a particular party, especially one that perpetrated humanitarian atrocities, 
would weaken the legitimacy of this government to the citizens that they represent.
173
 
Third the involvement of external intervention for peace can weaken the establishment of 
state institutions as they are not resilient enough to facilitate the required tasks. Therefore 
international organizations may bypass these entities in the establishment of state 
infrastructure. This can lead to the state becoming reliant on the international 
organization or may weaken their role within society as the people associate their 
assistance with the international community over their own state. Lastly the international 
community may focus too much on the establishment of government organizations while 
excluding local entities that wield vast authority and influence. For example, the 
establishment of a central government in Afghanistan has alienated some of the local 
tribal leaders which can hurt the legitimacy of the central government. I think that 
Menocal does make valid points in regards to the potential conflicts between peace 
building and state building; she also does not offer an alternative. Going back to my 
original argument, the establishment of peace is futile if the international community 
does not ensure the peace for the long term. This long term peace requires the state to be 
able to stand on its own otherwise the fragile state will remain fragile while becoming a 
charity case for the international community. Therefore despite the obvious 
contradictions, the natural progression from peace building to state building remains a 
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necessary step. Where Menocal’s research is vital is that it establishes the potential 
contradictions which inform policy makers. 
 Author Roland Paris studies the foundations of current peacebuilding operations 
and basically relates peacebuilding/ nation building to social engineering in that 
international institutions are attempting to influence fragile states by implementing 
liberalist ideals of democracy and free markets.
174
 The problem with this, according to 
Paris, is that both democracy and free market capitalism require and promote conflict 
within their basic principles. Fragile states do not maintain the institutional infrastructure 
to control this conflict or dissuade conflicting parties from resorting to violence.
175
 He 
argues that for some fragile states it may be better in the short term to maintain 
authoritarian governments, have warring factions share power or promote partition in 
order create stability.
176
 To support his claim he highlights how only one of the post-cold 
war peace building missions appears to have created stable peace.
177
 He however does 
not abandon the fundamental principles of liberal internationalism but argues that it is the 
implementation of these principles that is flawed. Paris therefore promotes a new version 
of liberal internationalism that he has coin strategic liberalization.
178
 Within this strategy, 
Paris advocates for a slower approach to elections and democratic implementation with 
the exclusion of extremists and the slower implementations of freedoms.
179
 In theory I 
agree with most of what Roland Paris argues and that this would be more effective 
strategy for building peace; however where his argument is flawed is that it requires the 
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sustained intervention of the international community to include donor states, without 
producing immediate results. It is sustained peacebuilding with limited nation building. 
You cannot transition to building governmental institutions that would be capable of 
taking over the running of the nation without legitimate elections and the involvement of 
the citizens of the state.  
 Eva Bertam argues that the hurdles facing the United Nations are derived from 
their own structures and mandates, in conjunction with inherent difficulties that are 
beyond their control. She also differentiates between peacekeeping, defines as the process 
of enforcement via monitoring, and peacebuilding which “seeks to remake the state’s 
political institutions, security forces and economic arrangements.”
180
 Her argument is 
relatively simple, first that the United Nations original mandate has always been that they 
do not interfere with state sovereignty and that they maintain neutral.
181
 Nation building 
requires influence of a state’s structure and therefore some manipulation of, winners vs 
losers, in a civil conflict, compromise and influence are all required. All of these things 
dilute state sovereignty. In the past they have justified their interference via the securing 
of consent from the opposing parties or via the argument that the existence of conflict 
shows that a functioning government already does not exist.
182
 The basic argument 
presented is that, since the original United Nations mandate is inconsistent with the 
current United Nations mission of peacebuilding, something will have to change. Either 
the mission has to revert to place sovereignty and neutrality at a higher precedence than 
peacebuilding or the United Nations mandate will have to allow for more flexibility in 
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regards to its stance on these cornerstones. To further bolster her point, Bertram 
highlights the inherent tensions between the uses of military actors to maintain peace 
versus the requirement for a more political aspect to build peace.
183
 Taking this one step 
further the tensions of negotiating between warring parties requires compromise and 
balance to facilitate the atmosphere for peace, while at the same time these compromises 
could allow for a continued role of a party that may have also been the cause of 
humanitarian atrocities. Allowing these parties to continue maintaining a role in the new 
government could very well eliminate any long term legitimacy in the eyes of those that 
were victims of this group. Without legitimacy peace will remain fragile. 
 The other side of Bertram’s argument is that mission success is often outside of 
the control of the United Nations. The UN must rely on both its members and the 
institutions of the failed state that they are attempting to rebuild. The UN is not a 
standalone entity but rather a conglomeration of nations, each with their own interest’s 
abilities and motivations. Often the more powerful members own interests may conflict 
with the interests of the UN, therefore they can often find themselves with a serious lack 
of support.
184
 This fosters itself usually through a lack of troops or funding that is vital to 
any potential mission success. Even worse the member states may initially promise 
support only to have a backlash from their constituents and withdrawal support latter. 
Even when the mission is in the obvious best interest of most parties there are inherent 
difficulties with bringing together the structures of different military entities. Command 
and control need to be specifically delineated and yet there can still be issues of 
compatibility with equipment, training or even the obvious language barriers. The other 
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primary issue for the UN is that they are dealing with failed states. These states often no 
longer have the required institutions to maintain their country.
185
 Without their ability to 
provide the basic fundamental necessities of life for their citizens the new government 
will quickly suffer a lack of legitimacy. Therefore the UN must balance that fine line of 
creating the required institutions in conjunction with the current structures, often run by 
inexperienced people, which will take time, or utilize their own personnel to create 
efficient institutions but also alienate the people who they will need to turn these 
institutions over to in order to leave. Both of these issues are outside the control of the 
United Nations and therefore can be serious stumbling blocks to their success. 
There is very little current literature on the use of Private Military Security 
Companies (PMSC’s) for nation/peace building. This is predominantly due to the stigma 
of PMSC’s as mercenary entities; however there have been great steps taken by this 
community to reestablish their legitimacy through self-regulation.
186
 In regards to their 
potential, some academics have delved into their possible role in future peace building 
enterprises. They site a growing threat in conjunction with dwindling military budgets 
and the fact that the United Nations is often deemed impotent in their response due to 
their inability to persuade member states to supply the necessary forces for peacebuilding 
operations. Allen Gerson touts the importance of incorporating the private sector into the 
early stages of the peace building process and makes the suggestion that the incorporation 
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of private security companies at this early stage could assist with creating the stable 
environment necessary to foster their engagement.
187
 
 The United Nations has also initiated the process to address their use of PMSC. In 
2012 the United Nations Department of Safety and Security published their guidelines for 
how any UN entity should select and incorporate PMSC’s.
188
 Within these guidelines 
they identify three primary conditions and purposes under which UN entities may deploy 
PMSC’s. First is for the protection of UN staff, second is only when warranted and 
assessed via a threat assessment and third is only when the host nation is unable to 
provide adequate security for the conditions.
189
  This guideline also specifies the type of 
functions that PMSC’s may engage in, protection of “United Nations personnel, premises 
and property.”
190
 This can be accomplished via access control and patrol of UN locations. 
Lastly they identify the vetting requirements for PMSC’s, which are first that they need 
to be signatories of the International Code of Conduct, second that they have been 
established for a minimum of five years, third that they maintain all required licenses for 
both their home and host country and lastly that they are registered as a legitimate vendor 
with the UN.
191
 The fact that the United Nations has established these guidelines shows 
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Case Study: Rwanda 
 Many people are familiar with the genocide in Rwanda through the Hollywood 
movie Hotel Rwanda. This movie brought the tragedy to the forefront of society’s 
viewpoint but could not cover all of the history of the conflict or the involvement of the 
United Nations in this tragedy. Rwanda had been in various states of conflict since the 
1950’s primarily based on the two primary ethnicities within the country, the Tutsi’s and 
the Hutu’s and their ethic, economic and social positions. Many people view this nation 
as another victim to western colonialism as this was initially a Belgium colony that 
propagated the minority Tutsi monarchy into power but then turned over power to the 
vastly larger demographically superior Hutu group after their 1959 revolution.
192
 This of 
course led to years of repression and conflict between these groups that included mass 
murder on behalf of the Rwandan government.
193
 In the 1990’s the Rwandan 
government, faced with a growing population and limited agricultural land, ceased to 
allow mostly Tutsi refugees from re-entering the country.
194
  This group became a 
significant component of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Uganda which was the 
opposition force to the Rwandan government during their civil conflict when they 
attacked Rwanda in October 1990.
195
 A delicate peace was brokered via the Arusha 
accords, but all this came to a head when on April 6, 1994 President Habyarimana of 
Rwanda died in a plane crash, that had little explanation.
196
 This death was the spark that 
initiated the mass killings of both Tutsi minority and any moderate Hutu elements that 
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stood against the government. This was carried out by government forces, the military, 
the police and even regular citizens, fueled by government lead propaganda and years of 
ingrained ethnic tensions. In the end estimates between five hundred thousand and one 
million Tutsi’s were murdered in some of the most unimaginable ways.
197
 
What few people fully understand is that the tragedy depicted in the movie 
occurred under the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission that originally started as U.N. 
Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) but, during the time period depicted, it 
had been transitioned into U.N. Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).
198
 The UN 
was present in order to ensure compliance with the Arusha Accords, which established a 
ceasefire and the monitoring of this peace by UN peacekeeping forces. This agreement 
also required a power share arrangement between the warring parties, which included 
minimum percentages for RPF positions.
199
 There was also a requirement to reintegrate 
RPF members into the Rwandan military, which was to be accomplished prior to 
elections and an agreement for the reintegration of refugees into Rwandan society. All of 
these requirements move the UN peacekeeping element into the realm of a peacebuilding 
operation. 
As a peacekeeping and a peacebuilding operation UNAMIR can be seen as a 
failure. The deaths of upwards of one million people are a testament to that. So why did 
this intervention fail and even more relative, why did the United Nations fail to 
accomplish its goal of transitioning Rwanda into a stable government?  
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The UN did attempt to lay the groundwork for peacebuilding through the Arusha 
accords. The key elements of this agreement do address some of the deficiencies that 
were noted in the literature but also highlight some deficiencies within the UN oversight 
of this peace agreement. Within the literature it is Paris who makes the assertion that 
democracy itself breeds tension. Prior to the signing of the Arusha accords the 
Government of Rwanda (GoR) was trying to become politically liberated via the 
development of a constitution and the inclusion of varying political parties.
200
 These 
parties however were more of a façade then a true representation of the desires of the 
citizens which only facilitated distrust and apathy between them and those that they were 
supposed to represent. The Ashura accords themselves highlight the idea that concessions 
necessary for peace may actually become a barrier to long term peace. Within the 
negotiations the RPF have a lot to gain, were in a position of negotiating superiority due 
to their military advantage and the affect they were having on the Rwandan economy.
201
 
On the other side the GoR was in a weak position as they needed the conflict to end in 
order to re-establish the Rwandan economy.
202
 Based on these two bargaining positions 
the GoR was forced to make a great deal of concession while the RPF was able to wait 
and gain a lot.
203
 The primary concessions were on the role of the RPF in the interim 
government and in the makeup of the Rwandan military.
204
 This lead many within the 
GoR, especially the radical elements, angry or under the assumption that they gave up too 
much, therefore many started to work against the agreement.
205
 In the end this may have 
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still been averted had the promised UN peacekeeping force been able to respond within a 
short period and thereby enforce the mandates of the accord. However with the slow UN 
response the GoR continued to delay the implementation of the Ashura accord further 
deteriorating the trust between the two entities while allowing radical elements to garner 
further support. 
 The catalysts for this genocide were of course outside of the control of the United 
Nations. Deep rooted historical ethnic division in conjunction with poor economic 
conditions, and the potential reintegration of refugees into a country that was starved for 
farmable land, which was negatively affecting the poor, all helped spur the hardliners 
within the Rwandan government to plan and execute the genocide that occurred. 
However once it began to occur and the humanitarian crisis became evident to the 
international community why were actions not taken by UN forces, with and established 
mandate to enforce the peace? 
For answers one has to look at the UN response to the genocide. As of April 6, 
1994, the United Nations had only 5,000 peacekeeping troops within the country.
206
 Of 
these troops many were centrally located in relatively few main areas and were lightly 
armed. Therefore the overall impact that these soldiers could have against 30,000 plus 
RPF and 30,000 plus Rwandan soldiers was minimal at best.
207
 In response to the 
escalating violence, which included the murder of ten Danish peacekeeping soldiers, the 
United Nations initial reaction was to withdrawal their forces.
208
 As the death tolls 
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escalated, only then did the UN decide to send in an intervening force but this was not an 
easy task at all. Initially no countries offered the forces or the funds necessary to have an 
impact, therefore there was no means by which the UN could react.
209
 Countries that did 
have soldiers on the ground complained of an inability for them to ensure their safety 
while feeling a serious disconnect between the UN leadership and their soldiers 
wellbeing.
210
 Eventually the UN sent in French troops but this was only a last chance 
option since the French had a long history of association with the Hutu government and 
there were fears that they would only support them against the Tutsi’s fueling the 
genocide.
211
 The UN response to the genocide in Rwanda highlights the impotence of the 
organization. They are unable to act without the support and therefore self-interest of 
their member states, which leaves them no flexibility to the ever changing situations on 
the ground. Michael Barnett states it best within his chapter on the Bureaucratization of 
Indifference when he states “no matter how grieved member states were by the genocide 
in Rwanda, they were unwilling to commit money and manpower to any operation 




Case Study: Namibia 
Few people have ever heard of the small country of Namibia on the west coast of 
Africa, probably because it did not even exist as a country before March 21, 1990.
213
 
During the post colonization period, South West Africa (Namibia) was partitioned by 
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South Africa as its fifth province, and encapsulated the country within its apartheid 
regime.
214
 This annexation was never ratified through the United Nations and therefore 
was deemed by the international community as illegitimate. The main reason that I 
choose to look at the United Nations involvement in regards to State building in Namibia 
is that prior to UN intervention there was no State at all. Therefore their involvement 
included a total incorporation of state building principles.  
The parties to the civil conflict, that ended with the United Nations Transitional 
Assistance Group (UNTAG) intervention, were the South West Africa People’s 
Organization (SWAPO) and the military actors of South Africa, the South West Africa 
Police Force, (SWAPOL) the South African Defense Forces (SADF) and the South West 
Africa Territorial Force (SWATF).
215
 SWAPO was recognized by the international 
community and the Organization of African Unity (AOU) as the legitimate representative 
to the Namibian people; however they did not have any control over the country.
216
 They 




One of the key features regarding the UN intervention in Namibia and South 
Africa was that it did not act until conditions were right. Initially UN intervention took 
shape in 1978 with the creation of a small working group, which consisted of France, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Germany (Western Contact Group) and 
the passage of several resolutions.
218
 This working group laid the foundation for the 
eventual agreement that didn’t occur until ten years later in 1988. Part of the delay was 
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the requirement of getting all parties involved into agreement. Not only was this a 
struggle between SWAPO and the South African Military, but also Angola, who was 
embedded in their own civil war, and where SWAPO forces were staged, and Cuba who 
was supporting Angola’s opposition, as a proxy for the Soviet Union, against the 
Angolan government supported by both South Africa and the United States.
219
 Therefore 
in order to obtain an agreement, all parties had to include an abatement of conflict and 
withdrawal from action in Angola. Once these agreements were in place, South Africa 
had reached a point where they were willing to acquiesce control over Namibian 
Territory and allow them to become an internationally recognized independent state. 
There were several actions that can be seen as consistent with the peacebuilding 
literature that may have set this UN action apart from the failure in Rwanda. As portrayed 
as a potential barrier to peacebuilding by Menocal, any third party actor must ensure that 
they walk the fine line between assisting the newly established government and allowing 
themselves to become the newly established government. Prior to the signing of the 
Nambian/Angola accords, the UN had established themselves to temporarily govern 
Namibia; however they were never able to implement this without concession of South 
Africa.
220
 Once South Africa did concede the UN established UNTAG as an assistance 
group rather than implementing a temporary government.
221
This allowed SWAPO to 
establish their particular government infrastructure with UN assistance rather than under 
UN structure. Also, unlike the Rwanda situation, both parties held similar positions in 
regards the necessity of agreement. SWAPO was significantly weakened by the 
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withdrawal of Angolan and Cuban forces and South Africa, while mired in a stagnating 
economy, was spending close to one million dollars a day that they could not afford to 
sustain.
222
 Therefore both parties to the conflict had reason to concede and negotiate. The 
last connection to the literature was that the UN, by declaring SWAPO as the legal 
representative for Namibia, did not maintain neutrality within their role as a 
peacekeeping force. This potentially detracts from Menocal’s claim that third party 
neutrality is a key component of ensuring that there isn’t a route back to conflict. 
In order to accomplish this mission UNTAG was formed and deployed which 
included military forces with the mission of observing and enforcing the peace, police 
observer units, charged with observing the South West African Police, and civilian 
entities charged with supply, election expertise and communications abilities.
223
 In total 
there were 4,650 members of the military portion, 1,498 police monitors and at least 
1,700 election monitors, not to mention numerous civil servant UN employees, other 
support employees and members of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO’s) who 
were also on the ground in support of this mission.
224
 In the end twenty one independent 
states provided support for UNTAG, either through funding or the presence of personnel. 
The UNTAG mission had three main components that included the demobilization of 
South African troops from Namibian territory, ensuring the withdrawal of Cuban troops 
from Angola and the oversight of internationally recognized fair elections in order to 
create the Namibian State.
225
 Under these primary missions, were also the requirements 
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to ensure law and order, prepare for the elections, and to ensure the release of political 
prisoners in conjunction with the inevitable influx of refugees into the country.
226
  
Historically this mission is viewed by the international community as a success as 
Namibia did become an independent sovereign state that is currently self-sufficient and 
stable. That does not mean however that the United Nations should take all of the credit 
for this. The primary reason that this mission did succeed is based on the overall 
cooperation of the parties involved. There were actually several incidents that could have 
derailed the state building process that were also out of the control of the United Nations. 
The truth is that the force provided was smaller than even the UN advisors had initially 
anticipated or required, primarily due to many of the member states being unwilling to 
provide the adequate funds and personnel that the UN felt that they would require to be 
successful.
227
 The lack of required support forced the UN to accept troops from countries 
who the opposition group did not feel were neutral in their stance on democracy.
228
 The 
number of troops was also insufficient to keep PLAN from engaging in cross border 
conflicts or the South Africans from attempting to influence the outcomes of the 
elections. It was actually South African restraint from carrying out several plans that 
allowed the elections to remain fair.
229
 Some will argue that the presence of the 
International community and the UN kept the South Africans from carrying out their 
election manipulation but the fact that some intimidation did occur with little UN 
intervention shows that it is more likely restraint that kept more from happening.  
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There were also other deficiencies highlighted with UNTAG. First is the question 
of neutrality and whether or not the UN was impartial? From the South African viewpoint 
the UN could not be impartial because they had already recognized SWAPO as the 
official representative of the Namibian people and South Africa’s annexation of their 
territory as illegal.
230
 On the other side the South African government was attempting to 
manipulate the elections results and, while SWAPO complained to the UN, without an 
investigative division, the UN was unable to actually substantiate any of these claims or 





 The genocide in Rwanda highlights the speed at which an operation can 
deteriorate and the necessity for the establishment of a secure environment prior to 
peacebuilding occurring. The Ashura accords themselves fostered the continued division 
between the two groups and with the slow response of the UN; extremist elements were 
able to garner support unhindered. Once the UN PKO did arrive on the ground much of 
the damage was already done and the UN had to quickly respond to a deteriorated 
situation. This requires a response capability predicated on the ability of the operations to 
adjust to the climate on the ground. This is a basic emergency management principle of 
flexibility. The UN already had elements on the ground whose presence had been 
accepted by both parties to the conflict; however the peace was tenuous at best. One 
spark, the death of President Habyarimana, was all it took to initiate the fire that was the 
Rwandan Genocide. The UN forces were unfortunately not prepared to actually carry out 
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their mission of enforcing the peace, once that peace broke down. They were prepared to 
provide a presence and therefore deterrence but once one side committed to ignoring the 
international community, the UN was helpless to respond. The UN only had 5,000 
soldiers in country compared to 30,000 plus from each side of the conflict. These units 
were also spread throughout the country but concentrated in the highly populated areas. 
There was very little presence in the more rural areas. These units were Danish, French, 
or from Belgium, all under the UN Blue helmet force but each had their own commander, 
their own rules of engagement, their own training and their own equipment. There 
appears to have been no clear rules of engagement once actually faced with an opposition 
force. Not to downplay the acumen of the soldiers on the ground but they were there to 
enforce a peace, not engage in direct combat with numerically superior forces. Once the 
Belgian soldiers took casualties their country was quick to pull their support for the 
mission and push to bring their soldiers home.
232
 I have always heard that soldiers’ 
coming home in body bags is bad politics for any government leader. This created a 
cascading affect that lead to the initial drawdown or the ‘defend in place’ stance that most 
peacekeepers took. The member states placed the value of their soldiers over the value of 
the victims to the genocide.  
This example highlights three key failures of the UN response to the conflict. First 
that initially it can be difficult for the UN to establish a responding force in a location 
with little geopolitical advantage. Powerful countries often invest when there is return, 
commodities like oil, or in defense of an established historical relationship. Most fragile 
countries have very little to offer, otherwise there would be more outside investment to 
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begin with. This can often leave peacekeeping operations vastly under supported. Once 
countries do commit they can be quick to rescind once the situation deteriorates, when 
their support is actually needed most. It may not even be a situation within the area of 
conflict. Some coalition countries may have an internal conflict, a change of their own 
leadership, an economic downturn, or internal struggle, which could lead them to 
withdrawal support. Lastly a coalition is difficult to manage due to chain of command 
structure, different training and different equipment compatibility issues. A Danish 
soldier will receive different training, answer to different command structure and have 
different equipment than say a Nigerian soldier. During periods of crisis, when time is of 
the essence, that equipment compatibility failure is highlighted. 
 
Analysis Namibia: 
 The Namibia success actually highlights some of the very same deficiencies that 
facilitated the failure in Rwanda. The force deployed in Namibia was far smaller than 
what was recommended to cover the natural geography of the region and to monitor an 
opposition force as large as the two conflicting parties could field. The UN set an initial 
goal of 7,500 peacekeepers; however they were only able to put together an operational 
force of less than 5,000.
233
 This figure even included some support personnel and 
logistics personnel. The UN even had to rely on personnel from countries that maintained 
an authoritarian government (Togo) to establish a democratic government. This lack of 
personnel was evident when SWAPO forces violated the peace agreement and entered 
Namibia. First the peacekeeping forces were so spread out that they were initially 
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unaware of the violation. Second when they were made aware, their forces were 
insufficient to stand against the SWAPO forces and they were forced to rely on South 
African Defense Forces (SADF), which could have easily unbalanced the operation.
234
 
There were some human rights violations carried out by these forces that would have 
been avoided if the UN had adequate forces available. Some may even argue that the 
success of the mission was more due to the constraint of the conflicting parties rather 
than the presence of UN soldiers. 
 So while again due to inadequate force the UN was unable to provide for the 
foundation of a secure environment that could have damaged the potential peacebuilding 
process. However, the fact that both parties to the conflict were ready to make certain 
concession in order to achieve their goal of ending the war was more vital than security. 
There were a lot of other positives that can be observed from this operation. One of the 
key take a ways is the need for specialization within the peacekeeping forces. One of the 
components to the success of this mission was the diversification of personnel assigned to 
UNTAG specific to their assigned tasks. This operation had the standard peacekeeping 
force, however this component, when faced with actually engaging one side due to a 
breach, they could not effectively respond. They also incorporated police monitors and 
election specialists. The police monitors were embedded with the local units charged with 
keeping the peace. They had the role of advising and training as well as monitoring to 
ensure that no human rights violations were carried out by those charged with enforcing 
law and order. This is not a perfect system, and does require the cooperation of local 
police; however it is a vast improvement over asking soldiers to carry out police 
missions. The UN police monitoring personnel were specialists in policing from the 
                                                          
234
 Ibid Pg. 8 
71 
 
different countries that supported the mission. The election specialists had the two part 
roles of advising those who were setting up the elections and monitoring the election 
venues to ensure that they were not tainted. Since the parties vying for power where both 
represented in the election process it is vital for both to acknowledge the end results as 
fair and unbiased. This is also vital for the international community to recognize the 
elected government as the true representative of the country. This can only occur with the 
presence of impartial parties ensuring the validity of the results. 
 Another shortcoming of this operation was the UN’s inability to investigate 
complaints coming from both sides of the conflict. As the group charged with monitoring 
the peace agreement, the ability to investigate violations of that agreement should be a 
fundamental component of the UN response. This was not the case however as there was 
no mechanism for the UN to process and investigate complaints against SWAPOL or the 
Koeveot (a militant arm of the SADF), even though they had over 900 complaints against 
them to include 370 from their own forces.
235
 
 The last inadequacy of the UN response that needs to be addresses is that of cost. 
An estimate is that the United States and South Africa owed around $562 million dollars 
for this operation.
236
 Countries that did supply troops and equipment were required to pay 
their soldiers out of their own budgets while assigned to this UN mission.
237
 Often this 
leaves only the major global powers like the United States and Europe capable of 
supporting peacekeeping operations. The stigma associated with this has always been the 
westernization of the rest of the world, similar to the international response to the 
colonization period. It is vital to mission success that the countries directly affected by 
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the failed state participate in the action necessary to develop and sustain a viable and 
legitimate governmental structure. 
 
The Role of PMSC’s in Peacebuilding: 
In regards to Rwanda, the UN was unable to provide for the foundation of 
peacebuilding which is the security that allows for the free range of movement and the 
inclusion of the society into all aspects of the peacebuilding process. Instead when things 
broke down the UN did not maintain the personnel required to intercede. Similar to 
peacekeeping operations the ability of PMSC’s to deploy rapidly could have been used as 
a force multiplier to re-establish the peace. It is also vital for NGO’s and Humanitarian 
serves of the private sector maintain the ability to operate within the country that they are 
attempting to develop. PMSC’s could provide the protection services necessary to enable 
these entities to operate while any peace remains tenuous. Once the environment has been 
stabilized PMSC’s could be incorporated into the training of local actors in order for 
them to provide their own security. This was not seen in Rwanda as the peace there 
deteriorated prior to the peacebuilding measures of the Ashura Accord taking hold. In 
Namibia however we do see the incorporation of private organizations to monitor the 
elections results and police training provided by the UN PKO’s that helped establish the 
security necessary for elections to occur.  
 
Conclusion: 
 The two operations were very similar in nature as both had difficulty garnering 
the necessary support for success in terms of personnel and were therefore understaffed 
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for the mission parameters. For Rwanda all it took was one party to decide to break the 
fragile peace and the Peacekeeping operations forces were ill equipped to respond 
effectively to the threat. The same can be said about both sides in the Namibian 
operation. Examples of this would be the PLAN moving their forces into Namibian 
territory and the SADF human rights violations while responding to the PLAN 
movement. Also there was evidence of South Africa’s attempts to manipulate the election 
results. Since both operations were inadequate, the primary catalyst between success and 
failure can be seen as the constraint of the conflict parties over UN presence. This does 
not mean that the UN does not have a role or importance in responding because the 
conflict existed prior to their involvement, however with inadequate forces the UN is 
incapable of actually keeping the peace once one side removes their support for the 
operation. What can be garnered from both responses is the need for improvement by the 
UN for future operations in regards to cost, support and the establishment of an 
investigative mechanism. From the Namibian operation we observe the need to for 











IV. Private Military Security Companies 
“This inevitability of conflict motivates us today and echoes the reminder that freedom is 
not given away and our national security is not achieved without sacrifice.”---Jim Walsh 
 
 
There have been two primary catalysts that have thrust Private Security 
Companies (PSCs) into the forefront of international society and have caused the debate 
as to what their primary role within this society must be. These two events are the end of 
the cold war and the September 11
th,
 2001 terrorist attacks. The end of the cold war has 
caused the global powers to limit their arms race and reduce the number of troops within 
their militaries, while relying more heavily on technological advancements.
238
 This is fine 
during periods of peace; however during periods of conflict, these smaller militaries 
cannot sustain some of the required duties necessary to the conflict.
239
 Military forces 
have therefore turned to PSCs in order to supplement their forces leading to the 
multibillion dollar enterprise that is the Private Security Industry.
240
 The technological 
advancements also called for more specialization than can be offered in most volunteer 
military forces causing the military to outsource control over some of their weapons 
systems to private organizations.
241
 After the September 11
th
 terrorist attacks the military 
forces were further divided and stretched between two fronts of Afghanistan and Iraq 
which only highlighted their reliance on PSCs. Further exasperating this issue was the 
decisive victory against our enemies within both fronts which left our military forces to 
engage in a new task that they were not prepared for, which was the inevitable nation 
building. We currently live in the age of terrorism in which there are no specific fronts to 
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this war. This requires all private organizations who want to participate within the global 
market to ensure the security of their operations against a plethora of enemies. For this 
reason PSC’s are not going to fade away but rather become an integral part of the 
international community.  
 As PSCs became more relied upon within these conflicts there were several 
controversial events involving members of this industry which caused many people to 
delegitimize the role of these organizations within these conflicts by comparing these 
PSCs to mercenary forces.
242
 Some of these events we will address later as case studies to 
include the 2007 Blackwater shooting which reportedly left 17 civilians dead.
243
 
Mercenaries and PSCs vary in many different ways and therefore should not be 
considered in the same category. The primary differences between these two entities are 
their organization, or lack thereof for mercenaries and the fact the PSCs do not engage in 
offensive combat while Mercenaries often have, even professionally like the companies 
Sandline and EO in the early 1990’s.
244
 PSCs do use force but this is for defensive and 
protective purposes.
245
 One of the primary mechanisms for determining the difference 
between mercenaries and PSCs is an established contract. Mercenaries usually do not 
maintain formal contracts or if they do they may incorporate illegal activities.
246
 It is for 
these differences that PSCs need to gain legitimacy within international society in order 
to avoid the stigma that has been associated with mercenary forces. The first step for this 
to occur is by the United Nations (UN) separating their working group on Mercenaries 
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 In order to determine whether or not regulation will increase legitimacy one first 
must articulate their definition of legitimacy. This is not any easy word to define as 
legitimacy could mean many different things to different parties. For example, while a 
majority of civilized society has deemed the State of Israel as a legitimate sovereign 
country, there is also an opposing viewpoint by some in the Middle East who refute this 
claim. In regards to Private Security Companies however I argue that total opinion is not 
necessary but rather a majority opinion that consists of the principle international 
authorities in conjunction with the States in which the PSCs are operating. Ian Clark 
presents his theoretical concept of legitimacy in his book “Legitimacy in International 
Society.”
248
 The main principles outlined in this book are that legitimacy is defined 
through three main avenues of “Legality, morality and Constitutionality”.
249
 These 
methods are the catalysts for ensuring that the party in question adheres to the established 
social norms and is thereby determined to be legitimate through the consensus of the 
majority.
250
 Ian Clark’s first principle of legality, when viewed against the establishment 
of PSCs, would require the existence of some form of legislation by which the PSCs 
could be held accountable for their actions. Along the same concept, Ian Clark’s second 
principle could be viewed as the adherence of PSCs to social norms. Lastly the idea of 
constitutionality should be viewed as the establishment of standards by the private 
security industry and an external unbiased regulatory body. It is thru this window of 
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legitimate principles that I will make my argument for a more robust international 
legislative form by which the world can ensure that the actions of PSCs within regions of 
conflict are held to an established standard and that there is a mechanism in place that 
would hold the PSCs accountable for any violations of these standards. As defined by the 
theoretical concept, this would establish PSCs as legitimate in the eyes of the global 
industry which would allow them to fulfill their primary mandate of protection. 
 When trying to explain the relationship between legitimacy and regulation, for my 
own clarity, I like to use the illustration of my brother in law Matt. Matt has spent the last 
thirteen years of his life serving in the United States Army. During this service he has 
deployed a total of six times and has served in both the Afghanistan and Iraqi theaters. 
His primary role within his unit was as a sniper. He therefore spent a majority of his time 
teaching and training other soldiers how to be proficient at shooting. Matt recently was 
medically retired for an injury that he received on his last deployment. In order to find 
work he moved to the Northern Virginia area and wanted to continue teaching people 
how to shoot. There is no question that he is proficient in this role however, regardless of 
his past experience, in order for him to accomplish this goal he was required by the 
Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) to become licensed and 
registered in the State of Virginia. Matt attended the required courses and is now, in the 
eyes of the State of Virginia, and via the consensus of local society, a legitimate firearms 
instructor. The relevant moral to this example is when Matt approached me after 
receiving his validation cards and stated that he did not learn anything new throughout 
this process and could have taught people how to shoot just based off his prior experience 
but without the card from DCJS he would not have been able to open a legitimate 
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business within the State. This should be the same for PSCs on the international level. 
While PSCs can operate without it, the appropriate regulation should lead to their 
legitimacy within the viewpoint of international society. 
 The use of non-state sponsored entities during periods of conflict is not a recent 
phenomenon. Private Security Companies have been around since the 1800’s in the 
United Kingdom and many private companies like the Pinkerton Detective Agency and 
Wells Fargo were around long before many Federal law enforcement agencies in the 
United States.
251
  The United States even used Private Security Companies during the 
Vietnam War to support its conscript military forces.
252
 For my purposes I will not 
differentiate between Private Military Security Companies (PMSC) and Private Security 
Companies (PSC) like many scholars do since their actions are in most ways 
interchangeable and therefore can change based on a specific mission. What I am looking 
at is the use of either entity within an area of conflict; therefore, going forward, I will 
describe both as PSCs.  
 While not new, there has been a recent increase in the use of PSCs by states in 
order to support dwindling military strengths due to the close of the Cold War.
253
 While 
these entities have been placed within the theaters of foreign wars, what has not occurred 
is clear and distinct international legislation that would ensure that these organizations do 
not engage in activities that would be considered violations of societal norms. As the line 
between the roles played by PSCs and state conscripted military forces becomes blurred 
there has been a growing outcry for an establishment of control from different scholars. 
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Without specific regulations to hold these organizations accountable they will continue to 
be viewed by society as an illegitimate group of thrill seeking mercenaries who choose to 
enter onto the field of battle, not for any moral cause but rather for financial 
compensation. It is my contention that by establishing legislative international controls 
over the deployment of PSC’s during conflict this will lead to a more legitimate 
viewpoint for what could be a vital component of global stability. 
  
Literature Review: 
 The only document that has been drafted in an attempt to specifically define the 
use of PSCs, within global conflict, is the Montreux document. The Montreux document 
is an international collaboration of eighteen states that came together in an attempt to 
present a unified definition of PSCs, establish any current international laws with which 
PSCs could be held accountable and to an present guidelines for how home states, 
contracting states, territorial states or other states should regulate PSCs.
254
 One of the 
valuable aspects that came from this group was a definition of the potential players that 
should be responsible for PSCs. This document defined these players as “Contracting 
states” which represent whatever state actually contracted their use. “Territorial States” 
are the location in which the PSCs are operating and “Home States” are the location 
where the PSC headquarters is.
255
 For example Blackwater USA (now Academi) 
originates in North Carolina, USA (home state) but could be contracted by the United 
Kingdom (contract state) for work in Iraq (territorial state). While these definitions help 
the international community understand the players, it did not designate any one 
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particular entity as responsible for the actions of the PSC. It actually helps blur the lines 
further by placing the onus of control on all parties involved. This document does 
establish which existing international laws can be used, based on their interpretation, to 
hold the PSC organizations accountable for their actions. The established International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) is this definitive mechanism but again, without a distinct 
relegation of authority, most components home, territorial or contract states, will look to 
point fingers at each other for responsibility rather than hold these organizations 
accountable. Cockayne in his article looks at the importance of the Montreux document 
in establishing the definition by which PSCs would fall under current IHL doctrine but he 
also highlights that most of the enforcement guidelines presented in the document are not 
legally binding.
256
 He also breaks down the specific sections of this document to show 
how the developing bodies came to their conclusions. His dissection of this document did 
show a lack of enforcement criteria which is common with most international laws. 
Without specification on who is responsible for prosecuting violations of IHL or for 
ensuring that the International Court has the ability to prosecute, then it can be assumed 
that some incidents that do violate IHL would fall through the cracks. 
 Gomez Del Prado takes a look into whether or not IHL has been used to hold 
contractors accountable in the past and conducts several case studies to highlight 
examples of how individual PSC contractors have not been held accountable for some 
egregious actions that include the indiscriminate killing of noncombatants and rape.
257
 
One of the means by which countries are bypassing the responsibility for adhering to 
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local law is via the method of an agreement between the contract state or territorial state 
and the home state in which the rights to prosecute any crimes by the contract state are 
waived and therefore the sole responsibility of the home state. An example of this is 
“Order 17 issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)” 
258
 which granted 
immunity from prosecution to contractors working within Iraq. 
259
 Gomez Del Prado 
takes an even closer look at the lack of legitimacy for PSC’s by conducting a comparison 
between them and mercenaries as defined by the United Nations.
260
 The United Nations 
has taken a closer look at these issues in 2005 and 2010. Their findings call for the 
registration and licensing for all PSCs, however Gomez Del Prado states that this is not 
enough.
261
 Beyond licensing and registration what is also needed is clarification and an 
establishment of international law similar to the Geneva Convention which, based on 
treaty, can be enforceable.
262
 
 Cockayne did dip into the idea of using the Montreux document as a baseline for 
contract development between the contract state and the PSC.
263
 Cioto takes this process 
one step further by describing the use of PSCs directly for contractors whose actions are 
carried out in a purely international maritime environment.
264
 For the commercial 
shipping industry there does not have to be a specific host state or contracting state 
therefore how can either entity be held responsible for the actions of the PSC? The effects 
of globalization will only continue to blur these lines as many organizations are no longer 
maintained in one specific state. Cioto argues that this responsibility will fall on the 
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shipping company, many of whom are global entities with headquarters in various states 
and therefore there should be standards for operation that include contractual restraints 
for violations of international law.
265
 Cioto uses the Montreux documents suggested 
guidelines for the development of contracts in order to ensure that there is some form of 
accountability. This should include established training requirements, use of force 
policies and contractual penalties for failing to uphold these standards.
266
 Cioto also 
highlights an issue with the use of current IHL for PSCs within a maritime environment. 
Based on the established IHL doctrine, these laws were not written with attention to 
private entities but rather to the actions of states during periods of conflict.
267
 According 
to Cioto, the Montreux document and the United Nations Security Council make a broad 
interpretation of established IHL as written by the Geneva Convention in order to make 
the correlation between IHL and PSCs.
268
 Regardless of IHL applicability which, based 
on Cioto, Cockayne and the caveats found in the Montreux document, they are unclear at 
best, the other viable option of contractual provisions would not solve the issue of 
accountability. Contract law does not usually hold an individual responsible to criminal 
legislation but rather the PSC organization. Historically, like the Coalition Provisional 
Authority agreement in Iraq; most contracts will push for immunity from prosecution. 
Companies justify this due to their normal areas of operation being within areas of 
conflict that usually do not maintain established or uncorrupt criminal justice systems. 
The written contract could specify legal accountability however the contracting body may 
not have the enforcement mechanism that will give the individual a fair unbiased trial. 
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Based on the suggestions of the Montreux document or contract law, individual 
contractors could still not be prosecuted for violations of societal norms, which would not 
lead to an increase in legitimacy of PSCs.
269
 
 Cioto also touched on another mechanism for PSC accountability since, if 
contracted by the Department of Defense, individual contractors and the contracting 
organization would fall under the jurisdiction of the Uniformed Code of Military Justice, 
Law of the United States or laws of a foreign government as established by treaty.
270
 This 
mechanism was established via the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000. This 
established law was readily discounted by Cioto since it was only applicable to 
Department of Defense contractors and not Department of State contractors.
271
 This is 
currently being tested with the recent convictions of DOS contractors under MEJA in 
Federal court for the Nisur Square incident. It is yet to be seen whether this conviction 
holds up in court. 
 Doug Brooks is another scholar that offers a unique perspective that is different 
from many of the other points of view. Brooks looks at the positive aspects associated 
with PSCs especially related to the personnel that are being hired by these organizations. 
Many of these contractors are retired or former military soldiers who have established the 
principles of honor and integrity through their service.
272
 This is also indicative of many 
mercenaries. It is the organizations distinct structure, organization and actions that 
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differentiate them from mercenaries. Their definition according to the United Nations is 
someone who:  
“Is specifically recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of participating in a 
concerted act of violence aimed at: (i) Overthrowing a Government or otherwise 
undermining the constitutional order of a State; or (ii) Undermining the territorial 
integrity of a State,”
273
  
This differentiates them from protection minded Private Security Companies who form a 
pseudo military organization, while mercenaries act independently of structure and 
contract themselves directly to an entity with no respect to international law. This 
definition also identifies the mission as a critical component to the definition. Based on 
this Brooks argues that the legitimacy needed for PSCs will come with time as those that 
begin to establish themselves as reputable organizations continue to gain contracts, those 
that don’t adhere to social norms will eventually fade away.
274
 Brooks looks at the United 
Nations use of PSCs for peacekeeping operations in order to reinforce his points.
275
 In 
time, Brooks argues, PSCs will be called upon for better defined roles that are not 
necessary based on an expression of U.S. power but rather, as smaller conflicts building 
throughout the developing world continue, they will be utilized more for peace keeping 
operations.
276
 With this trend the security industry will continue to regulate itself via their 
processes of legitimization in order to ensure that the entire industry continues to grow. 
Organizations that have made fast cash by pushing out people without properly enforcing 
their activity will not continue to receive contracts and therefore will not survive. I would 
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agree to this in theory however we have seen Blackwater USA being banned from 
operations in Iraq only to change their name to XE and eventually Academi. This 
organization remains operational in Iraq and even worse is now making money via 
training other PSCs personnel prior to them sending them over to Iraq.  
 There are two other common viewpoints that have not been addressed above. 
Both are discussed by Brooks and Mangan in their article “The Modern use of 
Contractors in Peace and Stability Operations.”
277
 These two ideas are more specific than 
any previously mentioned. The first states that since PSCs act upon theaters of conflict, it 
is therefore incumbent upon the home states, if they are attempting to influence the 
conflict area, to have the ability to hold the PSCs accountable.
278
 I agree with this 
premise when basing this on the United States or the UK during operations in Iraq or 
Afghanistan. This is feasible due to the more prominent nations having a vested interest 
in the conflict area and therefore the established infrastructure to maintain the PSCs. 
However this is not always the case, many PSCs are contracted directly to elements 
within the conflict area, like President Karzi’s security detail, and therefore the United 
States would have no input into oversight or regulation of these entities. As an 
independent organization working within a global marketplace, and having a direct 
contract with another sovereign nation, the United States should not be held accountable 
to the actions of personnel when they are not involved. Along the same lines the United 
States has also contracted companies like Aegis Defense Services Limited which is 
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headquartered in London England.
279
 Is the United States as the contractor or is England 
as the home state responsible for this company? This of course brings up the opposite 
viewpoint of requiring the host nation to regulate the PSCs working within their borders. 
However, as we have seen in numerous countries, Iraq and Afghanistan included, these 
nations are undergoing internal strife and turmoil and therefore may not have the required 




 The conclusion presented by Brooks and Mangan argues that, within the current 
legislation established by the various components of host, contract, international and 
home states, there is sufficient coverage to ensure the proper oversight of PSCs.
281
 Based 
on my personal knowledge of several incidents that were highly publicized in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, my hypothesis is that this is not the case. In actuality the currently 
established governance and legislation is wholly insufficient to manage these globally 
controlled organizations. Therefore it is incumbent upon the international community to 
establish clear areas of responsibility, avenues of accountability and international 
licenses, security regulations and business practices, beyond the unbinding Montreux 
document, in order to truly legitimize this industry within the eyes of society. It is 
therefore my contention that an increase in regulation governing PSCs will have a direct 
impact on the increase in PSC legitimacy within the international community. 
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 In order to confirm or refute my hypothesis I plan on using the above mentioned 
control criteria, International Humanitarian Law, self-regulation, the Montreux document, 
current contract law and host vs. contract vs. home responsibilities, against a variety of 
case studies in which the clear violations of societal norms were made, to determine if 
these current regulatory principles would have sufficed to hold the perpetrators 
accountable to their actions. This is based on my original premise that PSCs are viewed 
as illegitimate within international society, as evidenced by the UN association of PSCs 
with mercenaries. I will also look at current entities that do maintain an international 
governing body and are viewed as legitimate. By highlighting both the current status of 
insufficient regulation and comparing this to a proven legitimate international 
organization that does carry international regulation, I hope to show the connection 
between regulation and legitimacy within the Private Security Industry. The below case 
studies were highly publicized via international media forums and are widely considered 
to be examples of illegitimate activities being conducted by PSCs within areas of conflict. 
 
Blackwater 2007 
 Blackwater USA was an American organization, headquartered in Moyock North 
Carolina. This company was founded by Mr. Erick Prince, a former U.S. Navy SEAL, to 
provide a wide range of security functions from Explosive Detection K-9 teams to 
Dignitary Protection and Military training.
282
 During the Iraq and Afghanistan 
campaigns, Blackwater provided primarily protective services for the U.S. Department of 
State for compensation in excess of more than one billion dollars between 2001 and 
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 During their time in country, Blackwater engaged in approximately 200 separate 
events in which they discharged their weapons with several occasions resulting in the 
deaths of Iraqi civilians.
284
 
 There are too many individual incidents for which Blackwater personnel could be 
held accountable for violating their contractual mandate to the U.S. Department of State, 
Bureau of Diplomatic Security, which was to act only in a protective and therefore 
defensive, stance. In order to simplify, the case study I will focus only on the 2007 
incident in Nisur Square, Bagdad from which 17 Iraqi civilians were killed and another 
20 were wounded. Some of the details in this case are still in dispute however what has 
been clearly identified is that on September 16
th
 a car bomb detonated near a location in 
which a U.S. Diplomat was in talks with Iraqi officials. Blackwater personnel were called 
in to secure the evacuation route at Nisur Square. Shots were fired, the cause of which is 




 While the specifics of this incident are still being contended, the bottom line is 
that this incident occurred in Iraq; therefore the investigation into the incident needs to 
occur at the scene, which is in that country. This could be used as an argument for host 
nation responsibility pertaining to the investigation and prosecution of this incident. 
However this is easily refuted by the fact that the Iraqi government gave up their rights to 
hold U.S. contractors accountable to their laws under Article 17 of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) which states “under international law occupying powers, 
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including their forces, personnel, property and equipment, funds and assets, are not 
subject to the laws or jurisdiction of the occupied territory.”
286
 Based on this agreement 
all the Iraqi Ministry of Justice could do is assist the United States authorities, in this case 
the Diplomatic Security Service of the U.S. Department of State, with their investigation. 
Iraqi officials did exercise their limited authority in this case by suspending Blackwater’s 
license for working outside of the Green Zone in Iraq but could not bring charges.
287
 
 Article 17 of the CPA agreement does charge the “parent state”
288
 with the 
prosecution of laws from “the exclusive jurisdiction of their Parent States.”
289
 It would 
therefore be incumbent upon the United States to investigate and prosecute this incident. 
In actuality the United States Department of Justice has done just that by charging several 
of the Blackwater employees with “voluntary manslaughter, attempt to commit 
Manslaughter.”
290
 This case was initially dismissed for violations of the Constitutional 
rights of the defendants during the investigative process.
291
 Regardless of this, one of the 
defendants did plead guilty to the charges prior to the case being dismissed and is 
awaiting sentencing.
292
Recently however the Department of Justice the defendants were 
been recharged with the same counts, however without the tainted information from the 
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 In late 2014 an additional four members of Blackwater were 
convicted of “murder, manslaughter and weapons charges.”
294
 These individuals were 
convicted under Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) which will now go 
before a Federal Appeals court in order to determine the constitutionality of this 
conviction.  
This brings to light the most prominent discrepancy with “parent state” or “home 
states” investigating and prosecuting these cases. Even when this entity does maintain the 
infrastructure to investigate crimes on foreign soil, it is extremely difficult to carry out 
this investigation. Areas of conflict usually don’t have the forensic capabilities of the 
United States or other developed nations, investigators will rarely have the access to 
witnesses that the host nation will have, and in areas of severe conflict, like Iraq, the 
safety of the investigators could be in jeopardy. Depending on the situation, occupying 
forces may not be looked upon favorably by the host nation citizens which brings into 
question whether or not the evidence that is collected is biased. Can these contractors get 
a fair and impartial investigation when the witnesses may not want them in their country 
in the first place? Or by the time the investigators can respond, secure the crime scene 
and begin the investigation, how many other local entities have already been on scene 
and had the opportunity, either advertently or inadvertently to alter the scene prior to the 
official investigation? Another issue with home states prosecuting these types of 
incidents occurs when the contractor is hired by an entity within the host state. Dynacorp 
contractors were hired through the Diplomatic Security Service of the US State 
                                                          
293
 Associated Press. New Charges in Blackwater Shootings. October 18, 2015. www.foxnews.com 
(accessed November 5, 2013). 
294
 Apuzzo, Matt. “Blackwater Guards Found Guilty in 2007 Iraq Killings”New York Times, October 22, 
2014. Accessed April 26, 2014 from http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/us/blackwater-verdixt.html 
91 
 
Department but assigned to Afghan diplomats to include President Karzai.
295
 Would the 
United States still have the responsibility to prosecute even though they were not working 
for an American entity? While it is clear that the United States is making a valiant effort 
to utilize its established jurisdiction in order to hold the PSC personnel accountable but 
what about the PSC itself? Blackwater USA no longer exists, however it has been 
transformed several times in name but it remains the same organization under different 
management. Blackwater USA was renamed, Blackwater Worldwide, Xe Services and is 
currently known as Academi, but it still offers the same services with many of the same 
personnel. 
Another issue with the prosecution of private contractors for their actions 
overseas by the home state relates directly to jurisdictional issues. Federal and State laws 
from the United States apply to actions conducted by individuals within the United States 
or it territories under US control. The United States does not maintain direct jurisdiction 
in Iraq besides that granted by the CPA and through their extraterritorial, territorial and 
maritime laws. In order to prosecute the members of Blackwater who were involved in 
the Nisur square incident, the United States turned to a provision of the Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) which was initiated to govern individuals 
overseas who were associated directly with the Department of Defense (DOD).
296
 In 
2004 however an amendment to this provision was added to include the contractors of 
other federal agencies than the DOD as long as their mission was in support of the DOD 
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 As the incident in Nisur square was in support of the extraction of a United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) official (a DOS subsidiary), it 
will be up to the Federal Department of Justice charged with prosecuting those involved 
to define this as a DOD mission and the Federal courts must accept this leap. At a 
minimum the defense should have a compelling argument against the application of 
MEJA in this case. Within the same realm of MEJA is the potential ability of the military 
to prosecute civilians during a time of war, and when the civilian is serving in support of 
the military, under the uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). This may be a viable 
option but it will more likely leave the door open for issues under constitutional 
grounds.
298
 This of course will be tested in the Nisur square incident as the recent 
convictions go before the Federal Appeals court.
299
 
Regardless of the United States efforts to implement methods by which to 
prosecute private contractors that fall under their areas of responsibility; this does not 
cover PSCs that do not fall under their jurisdiction. The next logical step in regards to 
ensuring PSC regulation would therefore be current International Laws. The Montreux 
document makes the argument that PSCs do fall under International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL) and therefore the contracting states, territorial states and home states all maintain 
the responsibility to prosecute violations of IHL by PSCs.
300
 The problem with this 
document can be found in the introduction which states “This document, and the 
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statements herein, do not create legal obligations.”
301
 This entire document only gives 
best practices for contracting companies and is not legally binding. IHL itself does not 
cover PSCs specifically therefore the application of IHL is based on the interpretation 
and projection of IHL which has yet to be tested. Under rule 5 of IHL “Civilians are 
persons who are not members of the armed forces,”
302
 Under the auspices of 
responsibility the “State is responsible for all acts committed by persons forming parts of 
its armed forces”
303
 PSC personnel should be considered civilian personnel and therefore 
they may not be granted many of the protections of IHL or fall under its jurisdiction. The 
bottom line is that the application of IHL to PSCs is controversial at best and to my 
knowledge there have been no attempts to prosecute members of any PSC under IHL to 
date. Therefore, as private citizens, the members of Blackwater who were involved in the 
Nisur square incident do not fall under the jurisdiction of IHL.   
 An area of regulation that has developed, with the increased use of PSCs during 
periods of conflict, is that of self-regulation. PSCs, in order to increase their legitimacy, 
want some semblance of structure and accountability in order to ensure that the industry 
is viewed as a legitimate component of international society. In order to display this 
structure PSCs had developed standards and guidelines, based on a best practices 
formula, which can then be projected via membership to certain groups. This membership 
is contingent upon adhering to the established best practices as set forth by their codes of 
conduct. Some examples of these membership groups are the International Stability 
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 and the International Code of Conduct for Private 
Security Service Providers (ICoC) that was established by the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC).
305
 These organizations incorporate established international laws 
that may not apply directly to PSCs however by making their membership contingent 
upon adhering to these established laws they are able to develop their application to 
PSCs. In order to give these organizations teeth, federal governments make their 
membership mandatory for bidding on the lucrative government contracts. For example 
the US State Department has made membership within ICoC a prerequisite for bidding 
on the Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) program which contains billions of dollars’ 
worth of potential protective contracts throughout the world.
306
 The problem with self-
regulation is that it does not need to be adhered to by the PSC when things do go wrong. 
It is not binding. Based on the continued existence of Blackwater’s development into 
Academi and its recent incorporation into ICoC,
307
 this goes to show that companies can 
transform themselves from illegitimate to legitimate entities after an incident occurs. 
Therefore the companies can dump the individuals who perpetrate the crimes, transform 
themselves, and remain a viable company within the eyes of the Private Security 
Industry. The new leadership may take the organization in a different direction but they 
cannot change the past. 
 Another viable option for the host or contracting state was set forth in the 
Montreux Document which established the incorporation of International laws via 
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contract. By implanting the requirement for PSCs to adhere to IHL or any other 
established international law, within the contract, the host nation is able to maintain a 
semblance of accountability via established fines and potential breach of contract. As all 
PSCs base many of their decisions on the bottom dollar the potential for losing revenue 
for a violation of the contract could be enough motivation for PSCs to adhere to the 
provisions established by the contract. Within this vein the host nation or contracting 
state can establish use of force, background checks on employees, adherence to local 
laws or an investigative oversight requirement within the contract making it legally 
binding for the contract company.
308
 None of these provisions appear to have been 
implemented in the contract between Blackwater and the US Department of State (DOS) 
as the only impediment that came from their actions was a review by DOS officials 
moving forward and the removal of Blackwater’s license to operate by the Iraqi officials. 
Either way this method of accountability does not actually hold individuals liable for 
their actions in regards to prosecution. 
 This incident occurred in 2007, six years later Blackwater USA has transformed 
into Academi and remains a viable billion dollar PSC with contracts all over the world. 
The perpetrators of this incident, while recently convicted, the outcome remains in 
question. The innocent victims of this tragedy still have not received final vindication and 
their families have not received any true answers as to what went wrong. This should be 
enough to show that the current accountability for PSCs within international society is 
insufficient at best. 
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Case Study: Abu Ghraib 
 PSCs provide for a wide range of services, many of which do not participate in 
hostilities but rather are supportive in nature. Some of these noncombatant services are 
translation and detainee interrogation. Abu Ghraib prison is located in the vicinity of Iraq 
and was used by military forces and contractors to house suspected insurgents. In 2004 
photos of prisoners being subjected to humiliation were released causing uproar from 
many Iraqis and Muslims. At that time this facility was run primarily by the US Military 
but there were also factions of contractors from CACI International Inc. and Titan Corp 
who were responsible for the interrogation and translation of prisoner’s interrogations.
309
 
These photos precipitated allegations of torture both physical and mental in nature.
310
 
Investigators charged several U.S. Military soldiers who were convicted of a variety of 
charges. However, even though at least four contractors were found to be directly 




 Similar to the Blackwater 2007 Nisur square incident, the contractors at Abu 
Grhaib fall under the CPA and are protected under Article 17, therefore they could not be 
held criminally liable for their actions under Iraqi laws.
312
 Unlike Blackwater 2007 and 
primarily due to the focus of the investigation being on US Military Forces, it does not 
appear that either CACI or Titan had their licenses to operate in Iraq revoked by the Iraqi 
Interior Ministry. 
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 Since Iraq has waived its jurisdiction to prosecute these contractors it should be 
incumbent upon the United States as the parent state to hold them accountable. The 
military personnel involved with this scandal have been prosecuted under the UCMJ; 
however no criminal charges have been filed against the contractors who were shown to 
have participated in the same events as the military. This does not mean that there are not 
current US laws under which charges could be filed which include the war crimes act (18 
U.S.C 2441), torture act (18 U.S.C 2340) and MEJA.
313
 Each of these laws is at best 
untested and therefore there is little precedence by which the Department of Justice can 
look to in order to determine which would be appropriate in this situation. Also each of 
these has been argued to not apply. The torture act only applies to actions occurring 
outside of the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction (SMJT) of the United States. 
Abu Ghraib falls within this jurisdiction therefore the torture laws do not apply.
314
 The 
War Crimes act is the application of the Geneva Convention provisions onto US 
jurisdiction however the contractors at Abu Ghraib were classified as unlawful 
combatants and therefore this act does not apply to them.
315
 Since Abu Ghraibs 
distinction as within the maritime and territorial jurisdiction it should apply to MEJA 
however, similar to Blackwater, the contractors at Abu Ghraib were not contracted by the 
DOD but rather by the U.S. Department of the Interior and therefore MEJA may not 
apply at the time of the offenses.
316
 Congress has amended MEJA to include those 
contractors hired by other agencies who are in support of the DOD mission and therefore 
now this law may apply but it cannot be retroactively applied to this instance. As was 
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mentioned above with Blackwater, the portion of the law “support the mission of the 
DOD”
317
 is subjective at best. Therefore any defense could present a valid argument 
against its application to this case. 
 As it appears that U.S. domestic laws covering international actions do not apply 
to the Abu Ghraib contractor’s and Iraq’s Interior Ministry waived its jurisdiction, one 
would have to look towards other alternatives of International Law or self-regulation in 
order to produce accountability for these PSCs. Self-regulation may affect the PSC within 
a market based economy however it does not produce specific accountability to 
individual perpetrators and as we have seen with Blackwater’s transformation and 
inclusion in ICoC as a legitimate organization that has pledged to follow their established 
code, these organizations can come back from public scrutiny and continue to thrive. 
Also as was seen by the inability to apply the war crimes act to these contractors due to 
their status as unlawful combatants this means that IHL and the Geneva Conventions also 
do not apply.  
 Criminal charges have not been filed due to the lack of clarity regarding the 
application of both domestic and international law specifically how they apply to PSCs. 
However there is a mechanism by which the victims of these crimes can at least receive 
financial compensation via the civil process. The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) allows 
foreign nationals to bring a “violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States”
318
 to the U.S. court system. Several victims of Abu Ghraib brought civil litigation 
against the private organizations CACI and Titan. Recent events however bring the 
viability of this option into question. In Virginia four of the civil cases against CACI have 
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been thrown out on jurisdictional questions due to the event occurring in Iraq.
319
 As a 
slap in the face, CACI then turned around and sued the victims to recover court costs. 
This suit remains pending in court. The Abu Ghraib scandal and the apparent lack of 
accountability for the contractors that were, through the investigative process, found 
culpable, again show a glaring hole in the current capacity of accountability for PSCs.  
 
Comparative Analysis: Blackwater 2007/ Abu Ghraib 
 The above mentioned case studies are only two of hundreds of incidents that 
could be studied that show the inability of any faction, be it the host state, contract state, 
home state or the International community to hold PSCs accountable for criminal actions 
occurring within areas of conflict. The importance of highlighting this issue is that the 
Private Security Industry, despite the United States pull out of Iraq and the winding down 
in Afghanistan, is only projected to grow.  The United Nations has projected that the PSC 
industry will become a $244 billion dollar industry by 2016.
320
 As this growth continues, 
the international community must establish a mechanism by which to ensure the 
oversight and accountability of companies that are actively engaged in the global market. 
The current legislative avenue for these entities remains vague, open to interpretation or 
impossible to enforce due to jurisdictional issues. The established legislation has been 
found wholly inadequate as can be determined specifically during the Iraq war and 
subsequent occupation. During this period there were approximately 180,000 contractors 
that were in country at the peak of the conflict and subsequent counter insurgency and yet 
few of them were ever prosecuted for serious crimes despite several highly publicized 
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incidents that did occur.
321
 This lack of accountability is holding the PSC industry back 
from becoming a viable and important protective mechanism in the world. With the 
global war on terror continuing without an end in sight and the history of rolling conflicts 
throughout the world, PSCs could be used by everything from Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) like the ICRC, to private companies engaging in peace building in 
order to protect their members during humanitarian missions. However without the 
legitimization that the PSC industry is seeking through its own incorporation of self-
regulation, these humanity based organizations will remain reluctant to hire and utilize 
PSCs. There is also the potential viability of using PSCs for peace keeping operations, 
without legitimacy this isn’t an option as the international community would probably 
condemn their utilization. The premise of protection on which these companies have 
based their business models could greatly assist the international community during 
periods of conflict or after natural disasters.  
 In order to bridge the gap between the above identification of a lack of regulation 
and illegitimacy to the correlation between the two, we would have to view the opposite 
spectrum of a legitimate international organization that maintains current sufficient 
regulation. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is a United Nations 
subsidiary that is charged with establishing the standards and regulations that govern 
aviation safety and security throughout the world.
322
  As evidenced by the high volume of 
international travel, it can be assumed that, within the eyes of most people, this form of 
travel is deemed legitimate. In total this organization has 191 signatories who have 
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agreed to abide by the guidelines proscribed by this governing body.
323
 Failure to 
maintain these standards would result in the dissolution of membership which would 
mean that they could no longer maintain a mutual relationship with the remaining 
members. Most travelers are aware of the Flight Identification code that is assigned to 
their luggage however many are uninformed as to the ICAO designator code assigned to 
their flight. This code is the primary identifier to the international destination location 
which notifies them that the incoming aircraft meets the standards delineated by ICAO. 
This specific code is the catalyst used by ICAO to enforce their authority, as without it, 
non-member airlines are unable to utilize a member airport. With 191 countries being 
members, the inability to work with these countries would cause a serious decline in 
revenue and reduce the viability of any nation that seeks to maintain an operational 
airline within a global market. The ICAO structure consists of the Assembly, Council and 
the Secretariat. The Assembly, which has a representative from each member state, is 
charged with voting on issues presented by the Council, electing Council members and 
approving the budget.
324
 This Assembly meets every three years, as called upon by the 
council or by one fifth of the member states.
325
 The Council consists of 36 members as 
voted by the Assembly and is the permanent body that runs the operations of ICAO.
326
 
They are also responsible for the creation and dissemination of Standards and 
Recommended Practices (SARP) which are the regulations by which member states must 
abide in order to remain members.
327
 The organization also maintains a training program 
designed to help assist with the implementation of the SARPs, and arbiter for disputes 













between members and an investigative body that ensures accountability.
328
 The 
Secretariat is the leadership position that oversees the various branches of the 
organization. 
 A regulatory body for the International Private Security Industry could mirror the 
regulatory body presented by ICAO. Member states would agree to abide by established 
regulations and failure to abide by them would result in the revocation of membership. 
Within this governing body would be the investigative branch that would be responsible 
for ensuring compliance. In addition to this regulatory and investigative body, legally 
binding international law should be written to specifically cover the integration of PSCs 
to the international marketplace. Violations of these laws would then be prosecuted in the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) similar to the standard IHL that so many scholars 
have tried to contort into being an oversight for PSCs. 
Conclusion: 
 The current literature has called for the enforcement of current documents 
(Montreux) and international laws (IHL) in order to regulate the Private Security 
Industry. Experts have called for the implementation or enforcement of the guidelines 
delineated by the Montreux document into contracts, the enforcement of IHL, the 
application of current laws by the territorial, home or contract states or even the laissez-
faire (let it be) approach of allowing the industry to regulate itself. What has been shown 
via these case studies and via the above critics of the literature is that each of these 
avenues is flawed. The case studies have shown that the actions of individuals and 
companies within this industry have not met the social norms or expectations for a 
legitimate enterprise. Since there have been few effective prosecutions to date under the 





current laws, and these few remain up for appeal, I believe there can be no argument that 
the status quo is sufficient. My hypothesis that an increase in regulation also leads to an 
increase in legitimacy is difficult to prove since the current viewpoint of the United 
Nations is that PSCs and Mercenaries are similar entities to be treated under the same 
focus group. I make the connection that PSCs lack of legitimacy, in conjunction with the 
case studies showing that there is also currently insufficient regulation, are sufficient to 
support the accuracy of my hypothesis. This remains a leap, however by presenting a 
regulatory body like the ICAO as a model for oversight that can be transferred to the 
Private Security Industry; one can relate an international entity that is viable, with a 
legitimate international organization, regulated by the UN. Based on this I feel that my 
hypothesis that an increase in regulation via an international regulatory body will also 
increase legitimacy is supported by the evidence. 
Both the international community and the Private Security Industry are seeking 
greater oversight and accountability within the global market place. This is a mixed bag 
for the PSC industry since over regulation could lead to a lack of viability for a company 
within this market. One country cannot implement strict regulation and oversight without 
the incorporation of an international legislative organization, otherwise PSCs within the 
restrictive state will defect to more lenient countries in order to be able to compete in the 
global market. It is therefore incumbent upon the international community, mainly the 
United Nations, to establish a regulatory body charged with the oversight of PSCs acting 
within the international market. As we have seen through the theoretical concept of 
legitimacy and the push by the PSC industry to separate themselves from mercenaries in 
the eyes of the international community, regulation, oversight, and licensure can all be 
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catalysts for increasing legitimacy. With this legitimacy PSCs could be a viable 
component for nation building and securing humanitarian aid to NGOs acting throughout 
the world. With the increase in globalization and the fact that we all are facing turbulent 
times in regards to the war on terror, we need PSCs to protect our international critical 
infrastructure and therefore we need them to be considered legitimate enterprises within 



















“There are many who criticize the United Nations. And those of us who know this 
institution well know that it is not immune from criticism. But those who argue against 
the United Nations advance no credible argument as to what should replace it. Whatever 




The case studies presented in this paper demonstrate only the tip of the iceberg in 
regards to the potential improvements that can be made to UN intervention structures 
during civil conflicts. However what is clear from just these few examples is that the UN 
does maintain a variety of shortcomings in regards to their response capabilities. These 
deficiencies are found in their mandate, their structure and within coalitions that they 
have deployed. 
The current UN mandates of neutrality and the avoidance of intervention in the 
sovereignty of a nation, often forces this international organization to sit on the sidelines 
while atrocities are carried out. The UN has taken a stance on this by implementing “the 
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity” into the UN mandate.
329
 This would require action without 
agreement from parties to the conflict in several cases. As we have seen in each of the 
case studies, the actual ability for the UN to remain neutral once involved is a fallacy at 
best. During the Somalia operation, they focused their forces on the removal of General 
Aidid. In Sierra Leone they eventually sided with the government forces over the RUF, 
after the RUF forces continued the conflict anytime their position of power was 
weakened by the democratic process. In Namibia the UN went into the operation 
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recognizing SWAPO as the representatives of the Namibian people over South Africa. 
Finally in Rwanda the UN needed to rely on the French for intervention even though they 
maintained a history of siding with the Hutu government. In no way do I suggest that the 
UN need to abandon their neutrality mandate in its entirety however, as we have seen 
happen, the situation will sometimes require doing what is right over the UN need to stay 
neutral while genocide is occurring. This realization may allow the UN to not hold so 
tightly to this mandate when faced with an obvious need for action and free the 
established peacekeeping response capabilities much earlier in a civil conflict.  
Each of these events has also shown how fragile the negotiated peace process can 
be. Each of these operations could have gone in drastically different directions had key 
events unfolded differently. Successes could have been failures and vice versa. This 
requires a UN response force that is able to remain flexible in the face of ever changing 
scenarios. The key to flexibility is forward preparation and planning, plus maintaining the 
ability to adjust the response to the situation. We have seen in each of these events that 
the UN has difficulty in regards to obtaining support for an operation from their member 
states. Unless there is a geopolitically important reason for response, some countries are 
reluctant to support an operation that will only hurt them politically, while not offering 
anything in return. In Rwanda the French intervened because of their long history within 
the country. In Sierra Leone the UN force was made up of personnel donated by 
neighboring states who had a vested interest in the stability of that country. In Rwanda 
we saw the predominate force being the United States who had no real strategic interest 
in the area. Their troops were withdrawn after the loss of support from the American 
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people after the “Black Hawk Down” operation. In Namibia we saw the diversity of 
personnel however the force itself was far too inadequate to enforce the peace.  
This inability to garner support highlights the key fundamental flaw in the UN 
response to humanitarian crisis around the world. Their bureaucratic structure already 
makes it difficult for there to be agreement, with several of the major world powers 
having different geopolitical interests, while also maintaining veto power within the UN 
structure. However even when consensus can be reached in regards to the necessity for 
international response, the UN must rely on their members for the funding, supplies, 
troops and any logistical requirements like the transportation of personnel. The process of 
gathering these things together takes vast amounts of time and cooperation amongst the 
varying countries. Countries have also withheld support in order to get concessions on 
other topics that are being negotiated within the UN. When people are being murdered by 
the thousands each day, the response mechanism cannot take months or years to 
establish. 
Once coalition forces are established this does not mean that the member states 
will continue to support the mission once that mission changes. As we have seen in each 
of the case studies these operations are fluid, often changing based on one key event. For 
example the death of President Habyarimana in Rwanda or the failed capture of General 
Aidid in Somalia. Support from the member states can even falter in the middle of an 
operation, sabotaging any progress completely. We saw this in Somalia as the US 
withdrew after the American people discontinued support. We also saw this in Rwanda as 
Danish troops were withdrawn after their soldiers were killed. At times this change in 
support may not even occur based on the situation on the ground. Again in Somalia we 
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saw an operation that spanned two vastly different U.S. Presidents and therefore two 
different strategies for the operations. This change in strategies from each altered the UN 
response itself. 
Once the response force is established you still have the interoperability issues 
inherent with coalition forces. Some member states refuse to place their soldiers under 
the unified command structure of the United Nations. This of course causes a serious 
division of command that can be detrimental to an operation, especially if one side is 
conducting operations without communicating effectively with the other side. We 
observed the consequences of interoperability issues during the Somalia Operation, 
during which the United States was carrying out their own mission without informing the 
UN soldiers in the area. Even under the same command structure, training and equipment 
issues could cause serious consequences when coalition forces do attempt to carry out 
their missions in close proximity to each other. We have observed numerous friendly fire 
incidents during coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Even when troops can be amassed, have similar training, and do agree to work 
under the same command structure, they are often asked to carry out tasks that fall 
outside of their scope of training or abilities. We saw in the Namibian operation the need 
for the diversity of personnel required for an effective intervention. The utilization of law 
enforcement experts in order to oversee the newly established local law enforcement 
system and the utilization of election experts to monitor election results are both 
examples of the necessity for specialization. With the difficulties surrounding the UN’s 
ability to gather support in general, it is very difficult to specify what that support is. 
Often this requires soldiers to carry out missions that they are not prepared for. Soldiers 
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are offensive actors trained for combat operations and can have a difficult time 
transitioning to the necessity for defensive tactics and restraint. In Somalia soldiers were 
charged with the distribution of humanitarian aid. At times these combat soldiers will be 
presented with a mission so far outside their scope that the necessary mission will not be 
completed at all. There were hundreds of complaints against both sides of the Namibian 
civil conflict. The military forces in country maintained no mechanism to investigate 
these claims as their assigned mission was to enforce peace not conduct investigations 
into violations of this peace.  
When presented with a problem it is beneficial to present a potential solution. 
Could the United Nations incorporate the use of Private Security Companies to correct 
some of the above mentioned discrepancies? One of the primary deficiencies covered 
above is the UN’s serious lack of flexibility to the inevitable reality of an ever changing 
and dynamic mission. PSCs however are only hampered by the availability of qualified 
personnel to hire. In the wake of the Afghanistan and Iraq operations, we can observe the 
rapid expansion of forces by PSC’s in response to the need. The number of private 
security force contractors at the height of the conflict in Afghanistan was around thirty 
seven thousand contracted persons.
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 This confirms the free markets basic fundamental 
principle of supply and demand. If there is a necessity for personnel and the funding is 
sufficient to adequately compensate them for their efforts, then the supply exists. Instead 
of being tied to the ideological, geostrategic or political obligations of their member 
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states, the UN would be able to provide personnel based on the demand of the operation. 
This would lead to much greater flexibility when the mission changes. They also would 
not be tied to the constraints of who the member states were supplying. If security forces 
were required they could contract out for this specific task. If police style operations were 
required they could accommodate this by changing the tasking to incorporate this into 
their requirements. Also the incorporation of PMSC’s would alleviate the interoperability 
of forces issues as these requirements could be delineated within the specifications of the 
contract. Chain of command would also no longer be an issue as the contract ultimately 
answers to the United Nations.  
What this would not solve however is the inability of the UN to garner support via 
funding for the use of PSC’s. This could be solved however by not tying the resources to 
any specific operation but rather require all member states to equally contribute to a 
peacekeeping fund, allocating funding prior to an intervention. This would be a proactive 
approach rather than a reactive approach that could save lives while negating the need for 
a geo strategic interest in order to garner support. Of course equal contributions would 
not necessarily be equal as many countries like the United States and most of Europe 
could afford more than many of the other members. A potential solution would be to tie 
the amount to a percentage of a country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This would 
make richer states pay more while the poorer member states would contribute less. With 
the bureaucratic structure of the UN this is probably not feasible at all as wealthy nations 
would have little incentive in being proactive and some countries would probably veto 
any attempt to pre-emptively provide the UN with funding that would allow them to 
create their own military force. What this would however offer to these more power 
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nations is the ability to separate the association of intervention with each nation’s pursuit 
of their own personal goals. This would also disassociate the intervention from their 
political capital. Government leaders would no longer be sending soldiers, who were 
either volunteers to defend their country, or conscripts into military service, into other 
states. Instead the United Nations would be hiring personnel from many countries to 
carry out an assignment.  We see this today with humanitarian NGO’s like the Red Cross 
today.  
The question of feasibility is viable for this topic in general and the truth is that, 
under the current conditions, the deployment of PSCs by the United Nations would not be 
a viable option. Regardless of whether or not PSCs would be able to fill the gaps in UN 
response there are two glaring deficiencies that would not make their incorporation an 
option. The first was highlighted in the third chapter of this paper and the second is the 
negative stigma associated with these groups. In order to utilize PSCs they would be 
required to be viewed as legitimate entities. The current lack of regulation and oversight 
for these organizations leaves them unaccountable for violations of international law or 
social norms. The implementation of an international governing body like that of ICAO 
would increase their legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. 
Similar to oversight and accountability it is also important for the UN to establish 
standards to govern PSCs similar to the standards created by ICAO for aviation. These 
standards should include minimal training topics and requirements, licensing and 
oversight for training programs to ensure that the PSCs maintain a standard for the 
personnel that they hire. Similar to the minimum standards established by the WPS 
program at the State Department one overarching standard protocol would ensure that the 
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personnel hired and deployed have a minimum level of efficiency. This could include 
more than just tactics and policy training but also cultural sensitivity training for the 
varying regions to which PSCs would be deployed. The increase and establishment of 
international training standards would go a long way towards establishing the legitimacy 
of PSCs in the world market. 
Most State leaders would be hesitant to give up control on their position of 
influence within the United Nations structure. For many, the thought of the UN having an 
operational military force would require the member states to succeed their control over 
this entity. This however is not necessary at all. The member states and the Security 
Council specifically would need to maintain control over the initial deployment of 
PMSC’s and would still have control over the allocation of funds once deployed. What 
would be removed from the power of the member states is the operational control during 
the intervention itself to include the ability to undermine the response by pulling their 
support. This would solve the inherent problem of a lack of continued support seen 
within the case studies. 
The last hurdle for the utilization of PSCs by the UN is that of stigma. Society 
does have a tendency to portray PSCs as shadow military organizations designed to 
conduct clandestine and illegal operations outside of societal norms. Truth is this 
portrayal under the current system is justifiable based on the examples that were observed 
during the course of this paper. PSCs have acted as if they were not accountable to 
anyone because the truth is they currently are not. For this reason the stigma associated 
with these organizations will need to be broken. The only way to break them is via time 
and future adherence to societal norms. The key to implementing this is via some form of 
113 
 
international regulatory body that can hold them accountable and thereby change the 
public perception. 
To answer the questions posited in this paper there needs to be continued research 
into the numerous successes and failures of UN peacekeeping operations and peace 
building operations in order to increase the effectiveness of these operations. 
Globalization, transnational crimes and climate change are three examples of overlapping 
societal issues that can no longer be addressed within the borders of a sovereign nation 
but rather requires cooperation and understanding amongst nations. One point does 
appear clear, that the UN does maintain a variety of discrepancies within its response 
operations. These discrepancies could be corrected by the implementation of PSCs that 
would account for several of the observed shortfalls however under the current situation 
this is not feasible due to a lack of regulation, accountability and the stigma that the PSCs 
have created for themselves. This does not mean however that they should be discounted 
completely as a potential option for the future. Rather more research should be conducted 
on creating an international accountability structure that would bring legitimacy to PSCs. 
The truth is that PSCs are currently being utilized throughout the world to protect assets, 
conduct operations and enforce peace, even by the UN themselves. However without 
accountability these organizations can only continue to try to regulate themselves. This 
will not solve the problem of the negative stigma with PSC’s or solve the necessity for an 
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